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Cloud Computing is a relatively new and appealing concept; however, users may not fully 
trust Cloud Providers with their data and can be reluctant to store their files on Cloud Stor-
age Services. The problem is that Cloud Providers allow users to store their information 
on the provider's infrastructure with compliance to their terms and conditions, however all 
security is handled by the provider and generally the details of how this is done are not 
disclosed. 
This thesis describes a solution that allows users to securely store data all a public cloud, 
while also providing a mechanism to allow for searchability through their encrypted data. 
Users are able to submit encrypted keyword queries and, through a symmetric searchable 
enCTyption scheme, the system retrieves a list of files with such keyvwrds contained within 
the cloud storage medium. 
Securing distributed storage typically falls into two major categories one being where 
the client trusts the storage medium; and the other where all trust is removed and the 
storage medium is assumed to be unsecure. The secure cloud storage system described is 
designed ill such a manner that trust from a public cloud provider is not required. This 
is achieved by adapting techniques used in securing distributed storage where the storage 
medium is not trusted. The solution satisfies confidentiality of data from the cloud provider 
or any other third party; data integrity can be checked; file sharing amongst users is catered 
for and a user key management and key-revocation scheme is in place, together with the 
ability to search for relevant files. These requirements are introduced and developed in 
t his research. A further advantage of the proposed approach is that if there is a security 
breach at the cloud provider, the user's data will continue to be secure since all data is 











nor whether their data may be stored in 'foreign' jurisdictions, where the provider could 
be forced to reveal data by a court order. 
The architecture of the system presented consists of two components, a Client side 
application and a Server application running on the compute cloud. The client side ap-
plication performs all the cryptographic operations on the data. Along with saving and 
retrieving data from the Cloud Storage Service, the server application performs the pro-
cessing involved in handling the encrypted queries by running on a virtual machine instance 
within the compute cloud. It performs these operations by using the search algorithm that 
is adapted from the symmetric searchable encryption scheme. The solution adds overheads 
in terms of additional processing time and the size of the additional meta-data needed, but 
this is considered tolerable considering the security functionality added. 
The design of the solution is described in detail in the document, discussing the data 
structures needed to keep data secure within a cloud storage provider, as well as the data 
structures and algorithms needed to authenticate with the server. \Ve discuss the adapta-
tion of the symmetric searchable encryption scheme, documenting the data structures that 
are needed for this functionality as well as the algorithms that will be necessary to perform 
the searching as well as the secure keyword generation. 
Functional testing was performed to ensure that the design of the system could be 
correctly implemented and satisfies the design requirements. After testing the prototype 
at a functional level, it was important to measure the impact on performance and storage 
overheads of the design. This was achieved by testing the time the prototype took to secure 
files of varying sizes, examine the storage overheads in securing those files, the difference 
ill uploading files securely and unsecurely and the time taken to execute search query at 











In examining the results that we have gathered in our testing, we have seen that our 
prototype imposes a minimal overhead. Our testing has shown that the maximum meta-
data overhead for our test cases was 910 Bytes. Since our overheads are insignificant, the 
impact on uploading unsecured data versus secured data is also minimal. \Vhen testing the 
searching functionality of our prototype we considered the response time at the client, as 
well the the performance of our search algorithm at the server where we have eliminated 
all network latency. 
It \vas equally important to show that this solution could be applied in a real setting. 
To demonstrate this we modified Alpine, a Linux emailingapplication.tointerface with our 
prototype and upload emails with keywords to the clond storage service. \Ve demonstrated 
this by creating a simple Python script that sends commands via a socket to the client. 
The client then executes the commands and send the Secure File Object to the server. This 
was all achieved with minimal effort and shows that this solution has real world applications. 
This research shmvs that it is possible to securely store confidential user data on a 
Public Cloud such as Amazon S3 or Windows Azure Storage without the need to trust the 
Cloud Provider. It is also possible to upload secured data while giving users the ability to 
search and retrieve only the encrypted files that they need. All this can be achieved with 
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Storing information securely implies that the information is confidential and is only accessed 
h\' legitimate users, that there are mechanisms in place to ensure data integrity and that 
consideration is given to authentication and access control. There have been concerns 
about the security and trust with regards to Public Cloud Providers such as Amazon's 
\reb Services[l, 17, 19, 10]. 
1.1 Motivation 
There exists a vast amount of infrastructure that is made available by Cloud Providers, that 
can be used to store information and perform processing, however research by Armbrust 
ct al. [1] show that users are very hesitant when it comes to storing private information on 
a service such as Amazon's Simple Storage Service. 
There has however been substantial research into securing distributed systems which is 
discussed further in Chapter 2. There is also a usability problem in retrieving only the rel-
evant encrypted information for processing, especially when there are network speed issues. 
There was a study performed by Hacigiimii~, H et al. [13] to develop a means to query 
a relational database. The aim of this study, as discussed in Section 1.2, will be to apply 












The aim of this research is to design a solution that provides users with a means of se-
curing their data without neccessarily trusting a cloud storage service, and analysing the 
performance implications. 
In doing this, user data will not be compromised should the storage provider be com-
promised in any way (either internally or externally) . The system will need to satisfy a 
set of requirements as specified in Chapter 3 in order for it to be deemed secure. 
The dissertation also examines techniques that can be used in providing a means to 
search through encrypted user data, in such a manner that the cloud provider is unable to 
gather any information from the queries and the results but the user has a selective retrieval 
mechanism. By doing this users are able to retrieve only information that is relevant to 
their search. 
1.3 Evaluation 
The hypothesis of the study is that secure searchable storage can be securely incorporated 
into in a cloud storage service. 
In order to evaluate the hypothesis we will need to evaluate if the approach satisfies all 
t he requirements of a secure storage system as specified in Chapter 3. \Ve will also need 
to examine the performance overheads of this approach and compare them vvith that of 
similar systems to decide whether the overheads of our approach are satisfactory. More 
specifically we will examine: 
1. The overhead of securing data and storing it on a cloud storage service. 













The project assumes that the cloud provider is not trusted and therefore all cryptographic 
operations are done on the client. The client computer is also assumed to be secure. The 
file owner gives access to users that can be trusted however the implications of malicious 
users will be discussed. The system only deals with a small number of files, in the order 
of hundreds, since the purpose of this study is to examine whether secure cloud storage 
can be achieved and not neccessarily how scalable it is, although this is also considered 
to be favourable and will be re-visisted in Chapter 8 on future work. There are various 
techniques that can also be explored to optimize the search process, however these are out 
of the scope of this project. \\le also assume that only the file owner is allowed to generate 
search capabilities for users who wish to search through the encrypted data. 
1.5 Approach 
To achieve the objective and meet the requirements we take the following approach. 
• Analyze the requirements of a secure storage system. \\le need to understand what 
needs to be fulfilled in order for a system to be deemed secure. 
• \Ve will to analyze techniques used to for providing searchable encryption and decide 
which one is most relevant to our setting. 
• vYe will then combine and adapt the techniqnes used in securing storage systems, alld 
incorporating searchable encryption into a systems design that satisfies the require-
ments and objectives. 












• Deployment of the secure storage system in a widely used appliaction. For this 
purpose cloud deployment of the folders of an email system will be tested. 
In following this approach it is our goal to realise a system that can securely authenticate 
with a system running with the cloud that accepts requests and queries. Our system is 
to secure all data before it is dispatched to the cloud. The system running within the 
clouds sole purpose will be to peform the search operations and no other functionality 
since the assumption of this study is that cloud providers are untrustworthy thus all security 
operations are performed by the client. 
1.6 Dissertation Outline 
The structure of the dissertation is as follows: 
• In Chapter 2 we provide background information into cloud computing and the tech-
niques behind scalable storage as is used by cloud providers. \/Ve then discuss certain 
methods that are used to secure distributed storage system and lastly we discuss the 
idea of searching through encrypted data. 
• Chapter 3 discusses the requirements that need to be satisfied in order to secure a 
storage system. 
• The design of the approach, to satisfy the requirements, is described in Chapter 4. 
This chapter discusses the data structures and algorithms needed by our approach as 
well as the design of the architecure of the system. 
• We then document how the prototype was implemented in Chapter 5. 
• Chapter 6 describes the testing that was performed on our prototype and documents 
all the information that was gathered. vVe test our prototype at both a functional 











• After testing our prototype we analyze the results and findings in Chapter 7 . 
• \Ve conclude our research in Chapter 8 by discussing the approach and discussing any 













This chapter introduces the ideas behind Cloud Computing and how it can be used. \Ve 
will discuss the three main levels of abstraction present in the cloud computing model as 
well as introduce the idea of Cloud Storage-as-a-service and describe two prominent cloud 
storage services. It is also important to look into how one communicates with such a cloud 
storage service, namely via REST and SOAP; as well as to understand how general Dis-
tnbuted Storage Systems operate with respect to Cloud Storage. \Ve will then review a few 
Secure Distributed Systems as examples of techniques that are relevant in designing secure 
cloud storage systems. Finally, we discuss recent work on Encryption with Keyword Search. 
2.1 Cloud Computing 
Cloud Computing is the emerging model where functionality is exposed as a service over 
a network, this refers to both Applications and Hardware. It has been generally accepted 
that there are three levels of abstraction within this paradigm namely; Sojtware-as-a-
Service (SaaS) , Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure-as-a-Service(IaaS).[22] 
SaaS means that Software is being exposed as a service over a network such as Google 
Doc's. PaaS allmvs for a software platform to be hosted over the network such as J\Ii-
CI'Osoft's Azure or Google App Engine. IaaS is the lowest level of abstraction and at this 
level virtual machines (VMs) are exposed as a service over the network, giving users the 
most flexibility as in the case of Amazons EC2 1 [22]. 











The advantage of using a cloud provider is that the llsers need not worry about the 
complexities of managing a data-center. For example, when using Amazon's EC2 service, 
t he user is simply given an EC2 VM instance and is not concerned about where the in-
stance is or whether is will still be available during network partitions \vithin Amazon's 
data-centers. Additionally using a Cloud Provider, a user only pays for what they llse. 
This is an advantage since users do not need to invest large amounts of money into a data 
center that will only be fully utilized during usage spikes, which may occur only a few times 
within a year, \vhilst being underutilized the rest of the time. 
Storage as a service is a way of storing data in a cloud in a manner that the data storage 
and replication is transparent to the user. Details of Cloud storage are discussed in Section 
2.2. 
2.1.1 Cloud Architecture 
Lenk et al. [22] describe an architectural landscape where there are different levels of ab-
straction nested in one another. For example SaaS sits on top of PaaS which in turn sits 
011 top of IaaS. One could think of Google Docs running on top of some platform service 
which in turn runs on top of a virtual infrastructure service. 
Cloud Computing Systems such as Open Stack2 , Nimbula3 and Zimory4 all follow a sim-
ilar architecture within their virtual data center environments. The key focus of Cloud 
Computing is abstraction, this allows the users to use the services without focusing on the 




















CU"O"' Ap,» -, 
U,,,,cj In t"rt"c" '-'I __ ~ 
V"'ual 
D~t8 ".,"~, 
''''t, .. , 
~"'wC" 
C~"o, 




l'ignr~ 2, L Ar('hil.cd mC a Cloud C()lllpiltin!-\ Environment 
As shown in Figurt· 2.1, a Cloud C01JlpIlliug Enviromnpllt can bp s~n to ('ollsi"t, of 
an Interface laYfr, an Abstrad layer, anl i a Phvsi('allaver. l:,...r~ 0f lhf clond intfra<"l- via 
tl,,' lnt.cr[il('c lay"r, rhe interfaCf' then cornmnlli{'at"~ with I..lW \'irenal dala ('c'ueer. The 
virtual dat.a ('~nt.'r i~ all abSeradi()n of t he physical hard wan" expo~iTlg a g"nl'rk (;Ompllt" 
insla!l(;e alld a !-\('neric storagf APj, Thi~ (HIl b" <'()lllpared t() Amazon \ Ela0tic Computp 
Cloud and Am'L'on'~ Sunple Siorage sPfI'icp. This diagram i~ a g" Jl('ml n'pr"sent.ati0Il 











2.2 Cloud Storage 
A cloud storage service is a way of storing data within a cloud environment. This means 
that a user submits one copy to the storage service via an interface as described in Sec-
tion 2.5.1, and all the replication and physical storage is handled by the storage service 
provider. The drawback with such a storage service is that all security is handled by the 
storage provider. Services such as Amazon S35 and t-.Iicrosoft's Azure Storage provide 
the cloud users with authentication keys that allow the users to access an object given a 
key. Offioading security to the storage provider has both advantages and disadvantages. 
An obvious advantage is that the user doesn't need to worry about the complexities of 
securing the data. However a disadvantage is that if the security of a storage service is 
compromised, then some user data may compromised which can have devastating effects 
if user data is confidential as was the case with LinkUp(~IediaMax). where the company 
went out of business after losing 45% client data6 . 
\iVe will now discuss Amazon Dynamo which is a key-value storage system used by 
Amazons internal systems as well as the Coogle File System . 
2.2.1 Amazon Dynamo 
Amazon's Dynamo is a highly available key-value store that is used by Amazon's platform. 
Dynamo provides a Primary-Key only interface which allows the user to submit a key and 
return a value. This is the type of service that is of relevance for our Secure Storage Sys-
tem, such as envisaged in this thesis for addressing the security concerns when storing data 
\\·ithin a public key-value store. Dynamo is an internal Amazon service, hmvever Amazon's 
S3 is also a key-value store, this will be used when testing our Secure Storage System. 
Data within Dynamo is partitioned and replicated by using consistent hashing[18]. Dy-












llamo replicates data on multiple servers. Since dynamo uses an asynchronous replication 
and update scheme, the replicated data will be eventually consistent, implying that incon-
sistencies can occur and it is up to the application to resolve them. Consistent Hashing, 
partitioning and asynchronous updates allow for Dynamo to be completely decentralized, 
highly available and scalable. 
2.2.2 Google File System 
The Google file system(GFS) was designed and implemented to be a scalable distributed 
file system. The system was built to function on commodity hardware, thus it was designed 
to be fault tolerant due to the assumption that commodity hardware tends be faulty. 
A GFS cluster consists of a single master and multiple chunk-servers. A file is broken 
up into a number of chunks that are stored and replicated across a number of chunk-servers. 
The master maintains all the system meta-data such as name-space, access control, mapping 
of files to chunks and the physical location of the chunks. The master is simply there so as 
to maintain system state and route client requests to the correct chunk-server so as to not 
cause a bottleneck. 
As shown in Figure 2.2, a typical interaction would be that the client connects to the 
master. The master then looks up the physical location of the chunk and then returns this 
address to the client. The client then connects to the correct chunk-server and requests the 
data. By doing this, the load is taken off the master. [11] 
2.3 Distributed Storage 
A distributed storage system allows client computers to access files over a network. This 
can be used to achieve higher reliability, by storing multiple copies of the data. If there 
are network outages in certain parts of the storage network then data can still be retrieved 
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are used to store the data as well as route requests and handle data replication. One of the 
challenges of using P2P is to provide efficient algorithms and techniques for object location 
and routing[25]. 
The simplest but most inefficient method of object location would be to query every node 
in the network for a given object. A common technique used by Chord[29] and Pastry[25] 
is to use a Distributed Hash Tables. A DHT uses an abstract key-space derived from the 
Key-ID of a storage node of object. This abstract key space is then partitioned in various 
ways so as to split ownership of this key space among the nodes. This DHT is then used 
to route the data towards the node that is in control of the sub key-space where a query 
falls in. Such techniques are used by Amazon's Dynamo[9] and Cassandra[21j9. This is far 
more efficient than the brute force method of querying each node, as it does not flood the 
network with queries. 
2.3.1 Consistent Hashing Example 
As discussed distributed storage systems need techniques for storing data efficiently and 
route requests to the correct storage nodes correctly. Consistent Hashing is a techniques 
that is used by the Amazon Dynamo system to ensure that data is available and replicated 
and that requests get routed to the correct storage nodes with the least amount of overhead. 
Consistent Hashing works by hashing every ID and then placing this hashed number in a 
'Circular' key-space from 0 to 2N. 
For example let us assume that there is a key-space of 25 - 1, this gives us a ring from 0 to 
31 as shown in Figure 2.3. Let us assume that there are three storage nodes NodeO, Node1 
and Node2 whose ID's hash to 3, 11 and 19 respectively. This places them around the ring 
as shown in the Figure. NodeO is responsible for storing items that hash into the key-space 
from 3 till 10, I\ode1 is from 11 till 18 and lastly Node2 is from 19 till 2. 
8http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table 











If there is a request for an item whose hash is equal to 16, then this request will be for-
warded to ~ode1 as this request falls into its range. Consistent hashing is used because this 
technique allows for scalability. If there is a new node added and it is placed in-between 
:'\ode1 and Kode2, then only Node1 needs to offload some of its data to this new Node 
and then depending on the routing schemes, some or all of the routing tables need to be 
updated. 
Replication is achieved by sending a copy of the data to another ~ ode in a consistent way. 
One could simply pass a copy to the next node in the key-space, or one could modify the 
ID of the data so that its hash sends the data to another region in the key-space. 
The disadvantage of this is that each node needs to store a table containing a list of all 
other nodes and this can become inefficient when there is a significant number of nodes. For 
this reason some DHT systems break up the node list into finger tables which are stored at 
the nodes as is the case with Chord[29]. The nodes then use these finger tables to store the 
addresses of successors to which the query should be sent. There is ultimately a trade off 
between the number of hops and the size of the finger tables. In high performance systems 
one would want to decrease the number of hops so as to respond to queries in the least 
amount of time. 
2.3.2 Cassandra 
The Apache Cassandra project lO is a highly available elastic fault tolerant distributed key-
yalue storage system. It makes use of the partitioning and replication techniques used by 
Amazon Dynamo[9] and the data model as used by Google's BigTable storage system[6]. 
Cassandra is a peer-to-peer storage system that uses consistent hashing, as used in Dy-
llamo, to achieve scalability and to remove a single point of failure. According to the CAP 
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Figure 2.3: Consistent Hashing Example: key-space is 0 to 31. 
ance. Cassandra has been designed to provide Availability and Partition tolerance with 
eventual consistency. When querying data, a client connects to a peer node which then 
services the request. If the peer does not have the information required by the client then 
the peer node requests the information from the correct node returning the results back to 
the client. 
2.3.3 Hbase 
The Apache HBase project is a distributed scalable Big Data Storell . It uses the column-
orientated store modeled after Googles BigTable[6] and is now being phased into being used 
as Facebooks message store[4]. This design values Consistency and Partition Tolerance from 
Brewer's CAP theorem. With the HBase system, a client is responsible for locating the 
information. The client locates the region server the client directly, not through a master 












2.4 Secure Distributed Storage 
As organizations store more and more data, the storage medium becomes a prime target 
for an attack by a malicious intruder[28]. The problem is that one cannot simply protect 
t he perimeter. There have to be mechanisms in place that will protect the data even if 
there is a breach in the system. 
One approach in doing this is to assume that the storage medium is already compromised. 
By assuming this the system can be designed in such a way so as to place no trust in the 
storage medium, so even if there is a breach then the data will remain secure. Another 
approach is to assume that all clients are unsecure, however this approach is not relevant 
to this work since the system being built in this paper will assume the the storage cloud is 
unsecure. 
A survey performed by V.Ker et al.[20] examined a number of network systems and 
secure network files systems. In their survey they state that there are a number of require-
ments that need to be satisfied for a file system to be deemed secure. A secure storage 
system should provide Authentication and Authorization, Availability, Confidentiality and 
Integrity, Key Sharing and Key Management, Auditing and Intrusion Detection and lastly 
t he system should have acceptable Usability, Manageability and Performance. The follow-
ing systems are taken from their survey since the techniques used in securing the data could 
be beneficial in design a secure cloud based storage system. 
2.4.1 Sirius 
Sirius is a secure storage system developed at the University of Stanford by Goh et al. [12]. 
Sirius was developed to be a security mechanism that can be layered on top of any network 











Sirius runs a client side daemon that captures all network file system events and does 
the necessary security processing on data being sent to or received from the file system. 
Since all the security processing is done at the client it allows the data to be stored in an 
untrusted environment. 
Each Sirius user maintains an asymmetric key for encryption and another for signing. These 
are called the Master Encryption Key (MEK) and Master Signing Key (MSK) respectively. 
File's are kept in two parts on the server. One contains that file's meta-data, access control 
information, and the other contains the encrypted file data. The file data is encrypted 
using a symmetric key called the File Encryption Key (FEK). The encrypted data is also 
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Figure 2.4 shows the structure of the Sirius meta-data file. Each Encrypted Key Block 
(EBK) is encrypted with the MEK. If a user has read rights then the EBK has the FEK, 











the EBK has both the FEK and FSK. This will allow the user to modify and sign the data. 
Data can only be be modified if the data can be signed. Users can verify the integrity of 
the data by using the FSK to check the signed hash of the data. 
This structure allows for file sharing since the owner of file can simply add an EBK for 
a new user with the appropriate permissions. Revoking a user means the file owncr needs 
to generate a new FEK, the revoked users EBK is removed and the remaining user EBK's 
are regenerated by encrypting the FEK with the Public component of the users MEK. 
2.4.2 Strong Security for Network-Attached Storage 
Another system that relies heavily on client side security is Secure :\"etwork-Attached Disks 
(S:\" AD) [23]. From their observations, Miller et al. found that in the worst case their 
s~'stem imposed a penalty of 20% for larger sequential transfers and almost no penalty for 
random access. 
Their design is to encrypt all data at the client and provide the server \vith sufficient authen-
tication information. SN AD encrypts files at block level. this allows for efficient random 
access. Each file has a key object, the key object stores a signed hash of the file allowing for 
users to the check integrity. The key object also stores a list of tuples within the body of 
the key object. Each tuple has a UserID, Encrypted Password and the Permissions. The 
encrypted password is the File Encryption Key, encrypted with the users Public Key. The 
permissions field is used by the disk to determine whether the user has the rights to perform 
the action. Figure 4 shows the relationships betwcen the objects \vithin the system 
Each SNAD node also stores a certificate object that holds user information such as the 
public key and an Hr..IAC key. 











data object and then signs the hash with the users private key. The disk is able to verify 
the hash by decrypting the hash with the users public key and then recomputing the hash 
of the data object. If the hashes match and the user has write permissions then the file is 
















Figure 2.5: SNAD object relationships 
Plutus[16] is yet another system that secures data by performing client side encryption at 
block level and not trusting the storage system. The Plutus system groups files together 
that have the same user permissions. This technique lowers the amount of keys that need 
to be generated and maintained. Plutus implements read-write differentiation by using 
a similar technique used by Sirius[12]. A writer has both a file signing key and a file 
encryption key while the reader has only a file encryption key. 
Plutus uses a technique call key rotation to revoke user rights. Key rotation creates new 











revoked, then a nevv generation of the key is created and all valid users are given this key. 
This allows revoked user to still read files that were accessible at the time of key revocation, 
however any subsequent changes are unreadable by the revoked user. An example of this 
is illustrated in Figure 5 
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Figure 2.6: Illustration of the Plutus key rotation scheme. The owner uses (d,N), 
the private key, to generate new keys. The readers use (e,N), the public 
key, to generate older versions. 
2.5 Internet Scale Communication Protcols 
2.5.1 REST Interface 
The REST protocol is the idealized model of interactions within a web-application. It has 
been designed to meet the needs of Internet-Scale distributed hypermedia systems by al-
lowing for scalability, general interfaces and independent deployment[15]. The most widely 
llsed protocol for REST is HTTP. HTTP defines a set of methods such as GET, PUT, 
POST, DELETE. These methods are used to access and manipulate resources over the 
Internet. 
The REST architecture defines three elements namely Data Elements, Connecting Ele-
ments and Processing Elements. Data elements are essentially resources that are exposed 











the network connections. Connecting elements present a general abstract interface for com-
munication. A Processing element is essentially any component within the web-application 
that handles requests and processing[15]. 
REST places restrictions onto component interactions. It ignores implementation de-
tails to achieve scalability, independent deployment and allowing intermediary components 
to reduce interaction latency. 
An example of a REST call is shown below 
http://www.acme.com/phonebook/UserDetails/12345 
2.5.2 Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 
SOAP, like REST, is used for exchanging information in a web services environment. It 
uses XML as its message format and usually relies on Remote Procedure Calls or HTTP 
for transmission. A SOAP message can be sent to web-service-enabled web site with the 
necessary parameters for a certain function. 12 This communications protocol is used by the 
jets3t library that will be used in the implementation of the prototype13 for this study. 
























2.6 Searchable Encryption 
The idea of searchable encryption is to allow an untrusted server to perform some operation 
on the encrypted data without gaining any knowledge of the information within. Boneh 
et al. [2] describe this as Alice having a number of devices: Laptop, desktop, pager, etc. 
The email gateway that Alice uses is supposed to route emails to the appropriate device 
based on keywords within the email. The problem is that Alice does not trust the email 
gateway thus all emails are encrypted. In [2], the authors describe a technique for allowing 
the gateway to route emails to specific devices based on these encrypted keywords without 
gaining any knowledge of the contents. 
Such techniques can be applied to cloud storage by having the cloud service provider 
return query results based on the keywords attached to the data. If there is a corporation 
that has a number of encrypted documents stored on the cloud and a user wishes to re-
trieve all documents with the keywords" Project XYZ, John Smith". The cloud provider 
can then use the techniques described in[2] process the query in such a manner that the 
cloud provider is unable to infer any information about the user data. 
Boneh et al. [2] developed a scheme that does the above by using bi-linear maps. The 
sender encrypts the message and keywords using the receiver's public key. The receiver 
then generates trap doors that will be used by the gateway to determine whether the mes-











Both [7, 27] describe various schemes that can be used to apply searchable encryption 
to documents such as using indexes to map keywords to encrypted documents. Such tech-
niques can also be used within a cloud storage setting to make searching an retrieval more 
efficient. The system described in [27] makes use of stream ciphers to encrypt the data 
while the scheme described in [7] uses a pseudo random number which is then XOR-ed 
together with the encrypted words to provide searchable encryption. The work done by 
Curtola et al. [8] uses symmetric encryption to provide encryption with keyword search. 
This can be used to provide more efficiency as symmetric encryption is much faster than 
asymmetric encryption schemes. The only problems are that such schemes do not work 
well when sharing with multiple users. This does not fit well with the Cloud Storage setting 
as such a system would need to be able to support multiple users. There could be a way 
of merging the two techniques to gain the multiple user support of asymmetric encryption 
and have the better performance of symmetric encryption. 
The work of \Vaters et al[30] describes an implementation of an encrypted searchable 
audit log using both Symmetric and Asymmetric encryption. Their system allows users to 
submit encrypted search capabilities that are then processed by the audit log servers to 
return the log entries containing the keywords specified. The symmetric approach was used 
for this research and is explained further in Section 4.5. Their asymmetric scheme uses an 
Idcntity- Based encryption scheme of Boneh and Franklin in[3]. The advantages of using the 
asymmetric scheme is that there are no secret keys for an attacker to steal. This however is 











2. 7 Conclusion 
III this chapter we have discussed the underlying principles that will be nsed in building 
a secure cloud storage system. We started by introducing the general concepts in Cloud 
Computing and Cloud Storage. We then discussed topics in distributed storage systems 
as well as some examples snch as Cassanora ano HBase. We then discuss how to secure 
distributed storage systems as well as the general method of communication via REST 














This chapter will address the needs of a secure storage system that should be fulfilled in 
order for it be deemed secure. In thinking about the requirements at abstract level, it is also 
important to think about the use cases of the system. There are a number of applications 
for such a system such as an Emailing System, an extension for Dropboxl or a Music 
Storage Application. Assume that this system would run as a service, accepting requests 
from other applications. An emailing system could send a request to this system specifying 
the files to be backed-up to 83, the keywords to be attached and any additional security 
operations. The use of Dropbox as an on-line storage service has gained popularity, this 
system could be adapted to provide secure searchable encryption for a Dropbox service. 
One could select the files to be uploaded then specify keywords and this system would 
perform all the encryption and other security operations before the files are pushed to the 
Dropbox service. 
Another potential use could be to store music on-line where the keywords of the song could 
be the artist, album and genre. 
3.1 Design Criteria 
In order for a system to be secure it must satisfy a number of criteria namely V.Ker 
et al. [20] provide a survey of the common secure storage systems and created a list of 
Khat requirements are needed in order for a system to be secure. The following list is an 












• Ensure the Confidentiality of the data being stored 
• :"laintain the Integrity of the data to ensure that it has not been tampered with. 
• Ensure that File Sharing can be catered for. 
• Allow for Key-Revocation when user rights need to be removed. 
• Ensure that there is Searchability with in the encrypted data. 
• Ensue that the system can recover from a Compromised Key-pair. 
3.1.1 Confidentiality 
The system needs to maintain Confidentiality of the data being store on the Public cloud. 
This means that only authorized users should be allowed to read the contents of the file. 
The system should not rely on the underlying storage to handle this as it is assumed that 
the underlying storage system is untrusted. 
3.1.2 Integrity 
The system should ensure that tampered or corrupted data is detectable. This includes 
unauthorized modifications to data by users with only read rights. The system should be 
able to detect when such events occur. 
There also needs to be a method to ensure that the access rights and other file meta-data 
have not been tampered with. This is to be modified by the file owner ouly, no other user 
should be allowed to change user rights. 
3.1.3 File Sharing 
File sharing is an important aspect in any work or personal situation. It is important for 
this system to allow file owners to grant read rights and read/write rights to other users 











keys" while users with write permissions should have some means of sign changes made to 
the data. 
3.1.4 Key-Revocation 
As file sharing is important so is the need to revoke user rights. If a user's rights are to be 
revoked it needs to be done in such a manner so that there is no way that a user can have 
further access to the confidential data. There are however two ways of revoking user keys, 
the one is to immediately revoke the key and the second is to revoke the key only when 
there is a change to the data. The logic behind this is that there is no loss of confidentiality 
to unaltered data, since the revoked user is not learning anything new. 
3.1.5 Searchability 
There have been advances in cryptography to allow for users to search through encrypted 
text as has been documented in Section 2.6. This can allow a storage system to receive a 
query, search for relevant matches and return the results without gaining any knowledge 
about the contents of the query or the results. This technique will allow users to safely 
store vast amounts of data on a public cloud and query for specific files \vithout losing any 
confidentiali ty. 
3.1.6 Compromised Key-pair 
Should a users key-pair be compromised, there needs to be mechanisms in place that will 
allmv for the system to recover from such a compromise. All files to \vhich this user had 











3.2 Assumptions and Constraints 
It is assumed that the owner of the file trusts the users to which access rights are granted. 
Trust in this context means that the user will not decrypt the data and distribute it. The 
user will not attempt to replicate the file under his/her name. 
It is also assumed that no encryption or decryption is done within the cloud. the only 
processing that will occur in the compute cloud is forwarding requests to the storage cloud 
and the processing needed for to respond to search queries. All encryption is to be done 
on the client before being uploaded to a public cloud. By not having any encryption or 
decryption occurring in a VM instance within the cloud, such as an EC2 instance, there 
is no potential risk of the public cloud being able to access any of the information since 
they do have priviledged access[24]. The solution is constrained to the class of applications 
\\" here this paradigm makes sense. 
3.3 Assessment 
These design requirements will be used to assess the design to ensure that it has fulfilled 
all the requirements. Chapter 6 will test and assess how effectively these requirements were 













The ann of this chapter is to explain how the system has been designed to fulfill the 
requirements set out in Chapter 3. The chapter starts by discussing the overall architecture 
of the system and how the Client and Server applications interact. The various operations 
performed by both the client and server are introduced. The data structures used by the 
s~'stem are then introduced and explained, namely the the SecuTe File Object, Secure File 
Object Key Words and the Network Message. Vie then discuss the Authentication Protocol 
between the client and server. The file system operations are then discussed and formally 
presented. Next \ve discuss the searching functionality of the system which includes the 
generation of keywords and how the server performs the encrypted searches. Lastly the 
users of the system and their access rights are discussed. 
4.1 System Architecture 
The system comprises of two applications. A client application that runs on a user's com-
puter, and a server application that runs on the compute cloud. The responsibility of the 
server application is to respond to client requests as shown in Figure 4.1. 
The client handles all security processing so as to remove all trust from the cloud provider. 
The client is responsible for encrypting the file that is to be stored, performing key man-
agement, user access management and communicating \vith the application running in the 
compute cloud. 
A user will log in to the client application by providing a password that accesses that user's 











with performing any other administration tasks as discussed later. The client application 
then authenticates itself with the server, as explained in Section 4.3, creates a message and 
sends it securely to the server application running on the compute cloud, as explained in 
Section 4.4. This server application checks the message header to determine the task that 
needs to be completed. 
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Figure 4.1: Overall system architecture 
Client Application 
Storage Cloud (53) 
The client performs all the security operations necessary to securely store data on an 
llntrusted public cloud provider. Each user of the system is required to have an RSA key-
pair that ,vill be used to sign data changes and access the File Encryption Keys. The client 
application creates Secure File Objects, all security operations are performed on this object. 
The security operations include: 











• Add Users 
• Remove Users 
• Hash and Sign Data 
• Hash and Sign Secure File Object 
• Check Integrity. 
The details of this object structure are discussed in Section 4.2.1. 
Once the user has performed all desired operations on this object, the client then sends 
this object to the server application running on the compute cloud. The client can send a 
number of requests to the server namely: 
• Put - Upload a file to the Storage Cloud. 
• Get - Downloads a file from the Storage Cloud. 
• Delete - Deletes a given object from the Storage Cloud. 
• Ls - lists all the items within the Storage Cloud. 1 
• Search - This is used to search for a given keyword within the Storage cloud. 
A typical flow of events would be for the user to log in, create a Secure File Object(SFO), 
place the contents of a file into the SFO, hash and sign it and send it off to the Cloud 
Provider. At a later stage, download the file from the storage service, check the integrity 
of the file and then possibly save the files un-encrypted contents to the local machine for 
use later. 











4.1.2 Server Application 
The server application is used as a lightweight interface between the client and the Cloud 
Storage Service. As discussed in Section 4.1.1, the server has to handle a few types of 
operations. Put, Get, Delete and LS (list bucket, similar to the Linux command) are all 
lightweight operations and merely generate a message that is then sent to and handled by 
the storage cloud. 
The server handles the keyword search functionality of the system. The client sends a 
search capability which the server then uses to find all matching file names and return this 
list to the client, as explained in detail in Section 4.5. 
4.2 System Data-Structures 
4.2.1 Secure File Object 
The Secure File Object is the container that is used to store data securely on the cloud. 
All security operations on this container are performed at the client, the server performs 
no modifications to this object. The structure of the secure file object is shown in Figure 
-1.2. 
Each secure file object has a unique file encryption key. any symmetric encryption will 
suffice. The attributes of a secure file object are: 
• File Name: The name of the object file. 
• OwnerID : The ID of the owner/creator of the file. 
• Last l\Iodified User ID : The ID of the user that last modified the data. 
• Read List: List of users with ~'ead access rights, mapping UserID to [FEK]pu 
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Figure 4.2: The Structure of the Secure File Object 
• Encrypted File Encryption Key: The File encryption key is encrypted with the owners 
Public key. 
• Encrypted Keywords: An encrypted string of keywords. This field is merely used ad-
ministration purposes since the searchable key\\'ord generation is a one-way function. 
It is encrypted with the same Symmetric Key that is used by the owner to create 
encrypted keywords by the owner, thus only the owner has access to this string. 
• Encrypted Data Digital Signature. 
• Secure File Object Digital Signature. 
As mentioned in Section 3.1, there are a number of requirements that Ileed to be satis-
fied by this system in order to provide a secure means of storage. 
Confidentiality 
The secure file object provides Confdentiality by encrypting the data field with a File En-











data field. The data field is encrypted using a Symmetric Encryption Algorithm, like DES. 
The File Encryption Key is only generated by the File Owner upon Secure File Object 
creation and when user rights are revoked. 
Integrity 
Integrity is maintained in two ways, firstly the integrity of the data field needs to be checked 
and secondly the integrity of the secure file object as a whole needs to be checked. 
Data integrity is maintained by hashing the encrypted data field then signing this hash 
with the users private key. The user then sets the" Last :vlodified UserID" to his own 
user ID. Subsequent users look up the Last Modified Users Public Key in Public Key List, 
decrypt the signature and check the integrity of the encrypted data. 
Secure File Object integrity is maintained by hashing all the fields of the secure file object 
except for those that users may alter(Last Modified UserID, Encrypted Data and Encrypted 
Data Digital Signature) and then encrypting the hash with the owners private key. The 
resulting hash is as follows: 
SFODigest = [F(FileName IOwnerID IReadList IPublicKeyList I [FEKjPuowner IPuOwner)jprowner 
",·here F is a hash function such as SHA or MD5. The hash is then signed with the owners 
Private Key. 
\\"hen a user loads the SFO from the cloud, the user then uses the Public key of the owner 
to decrypt the Digest and chec'{ the hash. 
File Sharing 
Like any file system, there needs be a way of sharing files with other users of the system, 











id's -+[FEK]puuser. Since the FEK is encrypted with the users Public key, that user can 
gain access the FEK by decrypting it with his Private Key. 
The Public key list maps user id's -+(Public Key, Is \\Triter) and is needed for two rea-
sons. firstly it is used to maintain a list of all user public keys to be used in key revocation 
as explained in Section 4.2.1 and the secondly it is used to maintain a list of which users 
have write access to the data with the is-writer flag. 
\\Then a user downloads a SFO from the cloud, that user will use the "Last Modified 
C serID" to look up the public key of that user in this list and check whether that user does 
ill fact have write access to this file. 
Key-Revocation 
\Vith allowing access to users there need to be mechanisms in place for removing access to 
users. Revoking a users read access rights means that the owner needs to generate a new 
File Encryption Key (FEK) and re-encrypting the encrypted data field with a llew FEK. 
Then the owner needs to remove the revoked user from the read list and the public key list. 
The owner then iterates through the public key list encrypting the new FEK with each 
users Public Key. The user do llot need even know that a new FEK has been issued, since 
the whole process is transparent to them. 
Revoking a users write access rights is to simply set the Is-\Vriter flag to false in the 
Public Key List. User revocation can only be performed by the owner. Once the changes 
have been made the SFO is signed again to maintain integrity. Since the SFO needs to 
be signed, only the owner can make these changes. This stops users from falsely assigning 












The design of the system assumes that users can be trusted, i.e. if an owner grants access 
to a user, that user will not be malicious. However measures should be in place so the the 
system can detect any malicious activity. 
If a user is granted read access, that user can modify the contents, generate a Encrypted 
Data Digest and set the Last Modified User ID field. However, when the next user loads 
this file, that user will do an integrity check. As mentioned an integrity check is done by 
looking up the Public Key of the Last Modified User; since this Is-'Writer flag is not set, 
the system will generate an error because an unauthorized user has modified the contents. 
If a read user adds write permissions then this change will be detected by subsequent 
users since the malicious user is unable to generate a Secure File Object Digest. This will 
inform subsequent users that there has been an unauthorized change to the secure file ob-
ject. 
There is another problem with malicious users that is not easily fixed and a suitable 
solution is beyond the scope of this research. That is the problem of a user taking ownership 
away from the file owner. 
Since all read users have access to all fields of the SFO, they can create a new SFO (thus 
becoming the file owner), copy the encrypted contents of the old SFO along with the read 
and public key list, name the new SFO to that of the old SFO, and delete the old version. 
To the other readers the file will still look the same, however, the file has changed owners. 
A solution to this problem is to implement a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that allows 
users to check whether a File ID maps to a given Owner Public Key. As this is outside the 
scope of this research, a more naive approach was taken. The file O\vner stores a local copy 
of the file list. This file list is then used to do a reconciliation with the files store on the 











activity has occurred. 
4.2.2 Secure File Object Key Words 
The Secure File Object Key Words(SFO Keywords) is used to store the secure keywords 
as generated by the owner. For every SFO stored in the cloud storage service, there is an 
attached SFO keywords File. These files are used by the server application to perform the 
cryptographic operations necessary for searchable cryptography as detailed in Section 4.5. 
The SFO Keywords three fields are as follows: 
• Random Bit String. 
• Flag. 
• List of encrypted Keywords. 
The use of these three fields in finding specific keywords is explained in more detail in 
Section 4.5. 
4.2.3 Network Messages 
This system uses two types of network messages: a Request Message and an Authentication 
Token. 
The authentication token is used by the client to securely transmit data across the 
nct\vork to the server. The fieldt: in the authentication token are as follows: 
• Key / Container 












These fields are used by the system in the authentication process to establish a session 
key. Key / Container field is used to transport the encryption keys as well as other infor-
mation such as the access key hash. The encrypted nonce is used for freshness as well as 
authenticating the server. The hash field is a digest of the message, the details of which 
will be explained in Section 4.3. 
The Request Message is used for the file-system operations of the system. This message 
is sent from the client to the server instructing the server which operation to perform. The 
fields of this message are as follows: 
• Container 
• I\Iessage Type 
• Digest 
The Container field is used to pass any additional information along with the request, 
such as a Search Capability or an Object ID. The I\lessage Type field instructs the server 
as to the type of request that is being sent and the Digest is used to maintain Integrity. 
The details of these operations and the use of the Request '\Iessage will be explained in 
Section 4.4. 
4.3 Authentication Protocol 
Each client has a local copy of the server's public key. The client uses this key to establish 
a secure connection between itself ar.d the server. The client generates a symmetric session 
key, encrypts this key with the server public key and sends it to the server. The client then 
sends its' public key, a nonce and the Access Key hash all encrypted with the session key 











In order for the server to connect to the storage service it needs these Access Keys2. The 
server can then validate the user by hashing its Access keys to those received from the 
client. If the hashes match, then the client is allowed to access the system. The server 
then stores the client's public key and sends the incremented nonce back to the client. 
If the client receives the correctly incremented nonce the client knows that it is securely 
communicating with a valid server. The protocol is displayed formally as follows. 
U sing the following definitions: 
C: Client 
S: Server 
Ks: Session Key 
Cpu: Client Public Key 
CPr: Client Private Key 
Spu: Server Public Key 
SPr: Server Private Key 
AK: Access Keys 
The protocol can be represented as follows: 
C ---7 S: [H[SecretKey IAccessKeyllEJ(s 
C ---7 S: [[CPulEJ(s I [NoncelEJ(s I [H[AKllEJ(sl 
S ---7 C: [Nonce+llEJ(s 
After establishing a secure connection with the server the client is then able to securely 
transmit messages with the server Llsing the session key, the details of which will be ex-
plained further in Section 4.1. 











4.4 File-System Operations 
Once a secure connection has been established between the client and the server as ex-
plained in the Section 4.3, the client can then send file system operation requests to the 
server. If the client wishes to send an object to the server, the client creates a new secure 
file object and then sends this object to the server along with a digest encrypted with the 
session key. The server can thus confirm the integrity of the message and the authenticity 
of the object, formally shown below. 
U sing the following definitions: 
C: Client 
S: Server 
Ks: Session Key 
.'lIT: '\Iessage Type (File System Operation) 
Co: Container 
SH: SFO Hash 
SFO: Secure File Object 
The protocol can be represented as follows: 
4.4.1 Upload Commands 
Such as sending a file to the Serw r 
C ---+ S: [j\IT ICo I[H[l\IT ICollE]("l 
C ---+ S: [SFOl 











4.4.2 Download Commands 
Such a receiving a file or file list from the server. 
C ----t S: [~IT ICo I [H[MT ICo]]EKs] 
S ----t C: [SFO] 
S ----t C: [~IT ISH I [H[:'vIT ISH]]EKs] 
4.5 Searchability 
This is the operation when users can submit querIes to the server which them returns 
results back. The server performs cryptographic operations over the files in the storage 
service, returning the results of the query, where there is a match. The scheme used by 
the server to determine the results of the query is derived from the Searchable Symmetric 
scheme that was developed in [30]. Waters et al. [30] developed two schemes in their 
research; a symmetric and an asymmetric searchable scheme. The symmetric scheme was 
chosen as it has a performance advantage over the asymmetric scheme. The advantages of 
an asymmetric scheme over the symmetric scheme are also not applicable to our setting. It 
is important to note that generating these searchable keyvmrds is a one-\vay process. Once 
a searchable keyword is generated, there is no way of retrieving the original keyword. For 
this reason there is the encrypted keywords field attached to each SFO. So that the owner 
may check which keywords have be,'~n attached. This extra field in the SFO plays no part 
in the query process though. 
4.5.1 Secure Keyword Generation 
In order to provide the secure searchability functionality, there are number of extra param-











in the Secure File Object Keywords file Section 4.2.2. Let \Vi be the i-th word in the 
keyword list. Hs is a hash function keyed with the secret S. Hmac-SHA1 is used for the 
hash function H and padding is some random bits. For each keyword the server computes 
the following: 
Ci is the encrypted keyword that will be used by the server to determine which Ci matches 
a given search capability. The list generate by creating Ci from each Wi is stored together 
Kith the SFO when uploaded to the cloud storage service. 
4.5.2 Keyword Search 
Once the owner has created an Encrypted Keywords List (EKL) for an SFO and uploaded 
this SFO along with the keywords to the cloud storage service, users are able to submit 
search capabilities and receive search results. 
Search capabilities can only be generated by the file owner since the secret key S is needed. 
If a user wishes to get a search capability for keyword \V then the owner will generate it 
as follows: 
The Owner then provides this search capability to the user, who then sends it to the server. 
Upon receiving d w the server then performs the following operations per file. 
p = Hdu(r), since r is storeci with the encrypted keyword list. For each Ci in the EKL 
the server computes: 











If the first I bits of x match the flag then there is a match for the current file. It returns 
the file name as one of the search results. This operation is repeated for every file in the 
Storage Service. 
4.6 System Users 
As is \vith most file systems, there are different types of users with different capabilities. 
In the case of this system there are three different types of users namely: 
• Owner: File Owner. 
• \Vriter: User with Write access, read access is implied. 
• Reader: User with Read access. 
Figure 4.3 shows the use case diagram for all users. This diagram illustrates all the 
actions that can be performed by all the users of the system. 
As shown in the figure, all users can Load a file from the cloud, assuming they have access 
to the access keys. All users can also check the integrity of the file, list the users and rights 
assigned to a specific file. Save the SFO back to the cloud and output the contents of the 
SFO to a file or terminal. 
Users with read access have all the rights shown in Figure 4.3 along with the ability 
to read the contents of the encrypted data field. 
A user with write access means that such a user can perform the actions that 'All' 
users can along with the rights shown in Figure 4.4. The write user can edit the encrypted 
data of the SFO and sign the changes. 
The File Owner can perform any action on a Secure File Object, the owners rights 
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This chapter has described the architecture, data structures and algorithms needed in order 
to satisfy the requirements specified in Chapter 3. The chapter discussed the client / server 
architecture and responsibilities of each. Then the data structures used by the system are 
explained in detail, namely the Secure File Object, Secure File Object keywords and the 
::\etwork ?--.Iessages. The chapter then explained how clients authenticate with the server 
and hmv the file system operations are executed securely. The use of searchable encryption 
is then explained, showing the algorithms needed in order to provide such functionality and 













A prototype comprising of a client application, server application with a communication 
interface for Amazons S3 was implemented using Java to run on a Linux operating system 
and uses standard TCP sockets for communication between the client and server. The server 
nms on an EC2 :vIicro Instance and uses the JetS3t 1 library to connect and communicate 
with Amazon's S3. This chapter begins by explaining some of the implementation details 
of the client and server applications along with the algorithms and procedures needed to 
satisfy the requirements. 
5.1 Client Application 
The client application is used by users to connect and transmit messages with the Server 
running on EC2. Each user has a 1024 bit RSA Key-pair that is stored in a key-store file. 
Each file owner has Searchable Key Store file that is used to generate search capabilities 
as described in Section 4.5. This file stores two keys, one is the SecureFileObject keyword 
key which is used to symmetrically encrypt the list of keywords attached to an SFO so that 
they may be later read. This key is a standard DES key. The next key is an HMAC-Sha1 
and is used to generate searchable encrypted keyword lists that will be used by the server 
to respond to user queries. The system uses the Java KeyGenerator class to generate the 
specific keys. 
The client application also contains a settings file that is needed to specify the location of 












EC2 inst.:Ul'-" to ,,·hich the diem. must conned, 
Communicat.ion i)(,tw"pu lite dienl und the s.'rver is adliel'<,d by serializing the N~twork 
"iec.sage, ~~ure file Ollje"t ami Se"urc Fi ll' Obj('<:\, K(,yWOld~ da1.a ~1.CllC1.11r"" and sencli,jg 
those o,w a TCP socket using ,lIt· Java ObjectStreamWriter or ObjtttStff'amHe8!ier. 
5. 1.1 Clie nt Algorithms a nd Procedure~ 
The following seCl.ion \l'ill <,xplaiu S<Jme of the COrl' procednrl's of the client application and 
how the client· sy~tem Wi).\; broken lip in t<> yariou~ ('()JllpOll"nl.8 
Figure 3.1' Sy~l.€m Components 
Figuff' 5. j shows t h~ "ariou~ components and claSS<.'s thai an' llsed by ill(' diP,,1 appli-
cation, The system C"Il ~ broke'n lip into two major ('omponellt~: the Security Component 
and the Communications Component, The inl<Tfa", is w;ed hy the user 1-0 interact with 











the RSA Key-store along with the Secure File Objects Key-store are loaded. The RSA 
class is used to extract the Public and Private keys from the RSA Key-store, similarly 
the Secure File Keywords Key-store class is used to extract the encryption keys from the 
Secure File Objects Key-store file. The Secure File Object Processor is used by the system 
to perform various security operations on a Secure File Object. The Cryptography class 
is used to preform cryptographic operations on data, this includes encrypting a byte array 
using asymmetric encryption or symmetric encryption and generating message digests from 
byte arrays. 
Security Operations 
The Secure File Object Processor class, as is shown in Appendix A.2, is llsed to perform 
Cryptographic operations on an SFO instance, the implementation of 'which is shown in 
Appendix A.I. It makes use of the cryptographic operations exposed by the Cryptography 
class. The SFO Processor provides a set of high level operations to the interface such as 
shown in Table 5.1 
The Create SFO Object command creates an SFO object in memory. This function 
takes the file's owner's UserID and RSA key-pair. This function creates the File Encryption 
Key and encrypts it using the owner's public key. 
The Add Read User command adds a new entry to the Read List. This function takes 
the user's ID, user's public key and the owner's private key, encrypts the file encryption 
key with the user's public key. The function also adds a new entry to the Public Key list 
'with the Is- Writer flag set to False. It then creates a digest of the object aIld signs it with 











Table 5.1: Secure File Object Processor Functionality 
Create SFO Object Add Read User 
Add \Vrite User Remove Read User 
Remove Write User Hash Secure File Object 
Hash Encrypted Data Sign Digests 
Verify Secure File Object Set Data From File 
Integrity 
Get Data Save Data to File 
List User Rights 
All block encryption was performed using the DES encryption algorithm 2 , with a 
default Java, key size of 64 bits as specified in FIPS PUB 46-2 :3. The creation of hashes 
for both the data fields and the secure file object was performed using the l\ID5 algorithm. 
Keyword Generation 
As explained in Section 4.5, a random number R and a flag F are needed to generate 
encrypted keywords, the class definition of the Secure File Object keywords is shown in 
Appendix A.4. R is a 512 bit random number and F is a 128 bit random number seeded 
with the system time. The system receives a number of space separated keywords which 
are then processed as explained in Section 4.5 and stored in a list of byte arrays. These 
operations are performed by the Secure File Object Processor shown in Appendix A.5. 
The Secure File Object Processor uses the Symmetric Searchable Encryption class, Ap-
pendix A.6, to convert the keywords to searchable keywords using the algorithm specified 












in the Section 4.5.1. 
Communications Operations 
Communication with the compute cloud is a two step process. The client first authenticates 
with the server, then exchanges data. 
Authentication is explained in Section 4.3, once authenticated the client can then send 
Network message objects to the server to instruct it what operations to perform. This is 
achieved by creating a Network Message object and setting the Message Type field and 
possibly sending additional information that is placed in the Container Field. 
For example, if the user wishes to Put an object, the client will set the message type field 
to PUT and send that object, then send the Secure File Object and potentially the Secure 
File Object Keywords to the server. Should the user not have specified Keywords for a 
Secure File Object, then client sends a NULL value for the Secure File Object Keywords. 
If a user wishes to Get a file, then client will set the Message Type field to GET and set 
the Container to the Object-ID that the user has requested. 
Client Interface 
The client application needs to provide the ability for other applications to interface with 
it. As mentioned in the use cases in Section 3, an application running on a users com-
puter would need an interface to connect with and send instructions. This functionality 
was implemented with the use of sockets. The implementation has a thread running and 
waiting for connections from applications. The application sends a list of commands and 
parameters across the socket for the client which the client then processes. As an example, 
the application could send the following string. "-password=pass -create=secureTextFile 
-add=/home/Bob/TextFile -keywords=Bob TextFile -sign -put". That command passes 
through the key-store password, the name of the SFO instance, the location of the con-
tents, the keywords that are to be attached, then a sign instruction which creates both the 











th(' di"llI, itpplicat ioll 10 nploitd thc SFa to the ~Ioud . This "pproc)('h "I:ow~ ,m\" applical.]()]l 
to simp'" 01"'1' it sod,cl., "onllGei io the dient. PIl,'jS tJ]r(lugh "')l"~ mtll11l!l1lds ,,'hi('h I.lw 
client th~n process~s und pi"S(,~ t.helll olll,o I,!w EC~ server The proce~s i~ illu~trklted in 
figur~ 5,2. 
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figure 5,~: All o\'~T\'i~w o[ the Cliclltlnt(',fitcc [or Applindions. Jl:ustmt~s how !Ill 
up pi i, Htwn ('im CA mIl('('t to t Iw eli ~nt ,ri" ~OCkN~ !lJtd send ins1l'ucl iOIlS, 
.'i.1.2 Senrel' A 19urithllls and Procedures 
The ""rver "pplkation runs on an E-C~ hlSI.(U~·:C' imel wait,s for Ullltle~tillns from cli~nts. 
\\'lwn a cli~1l1 COIlIl('CI,S, it i~ ors1 ilUtlwIlt,i""tt'd th~n th~ ""rvcr call r~cei\'" in,I,[lJctiOllS. 
"lost o[ Ul<' ill,true timlS ar~ Silt1pl:-· pushed fOlward to I.lw doud SI,Onll'/' "'Tvi,,~ ,\ 1' )' vi" 
our A"lk':>:OllliS;l abstraction cinss which is ddill('d ill !\ppc11<:iix A .. 3. When a serwr r=ives 











tll<' <l1\.IIL" s\Je<,jIi('(! 111 Ih,' sro. aud fm tlll' l«'\'\\(lrd~ file it appf'ncib 'ko')'wonb. ' \0 Ih~ 
lwgilmilll', of Ib" n~me 
When th. ' .~<T""r n', '({~ to !i<-a,,-b. il will !e<-ehoe .. .va!J'od; ,I[",''''q( WJlh Ih,. Me"s",!" l"'r~ 
fi. M 5el to SfalTh alld Lh., ~,· .. "h '";)I'"bihl," .;;(0100 in th,.. COllt{flllfl' !kld 
Ttli' ,..'r\"O'J Ih"" r"I1U"'l~ !'I lisl of all th ... fih", starlillg " itb 'k,-\'w{,rJs T hen ror .,(\('h till' 
U\ the list, thO' SI'rWt ""UH<'I ~ t1w kevwords IU thllt tik , and rOl1l1>a1l'S th"HI 1." th" se."n,h 
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,LI!> lIn .. · fill:,; slOrl'd (III S3 ''ach with a li~t (,I k('}'\\ord~. If the ..en~r r"'n n'S" '·"pahilil.\' 











examplf a.5sume that there Ill" ~ two emryptoo keywords stored in ·hywords.filel· namely: 
sdfgt.+(b and bmgtva/' TIHc .,crvcr will C<JllllJULe x __ P xor .'.dfgt+(lJ aud x ,= r xOr 
has tlw givcu kcvword aHaclwd to i1 .. This process is rflWated for ·keywonl.filf2· and 
'kcvword.filc3' . 
. Jets3L 
.kt.ilt. is a library 1.hat. iR lJrr>l"ided by Amaznn.comto lJlOvidc ,levdopcrR with an ~a,j~r wiW 
of cOllnecting to the Amazon Sim)!l ~ SWrilge S~rvire. ltl unr implement.ation W{' flb.,irlldI'd 
"way ccrt.:Un olJcraliou:l to make it simpler 1.0 upload files through the JctS;)t librarv. 
\r{' imlJkmcllL\'d tIl(' PlltScellleFilcObjtd method whidl takes [l, Sc("tlrc File OlJject as a 
ps.f'lmetfr aHd uplolHb it. t.o S3 via t tl(' Jd S3t. librm:y. Ilil object ('Il~ting i~ hllHdled withill 
in this method, Simila.rly we implfmented thc GetSl"CurcFilcObjcd method w]lidl t.alcs 
,ill objed kev <is i1 lJ,u-amct,{T awl r('tilrns a S('cllI{-FIl('Objed ()] l\Ut.L If the objef't key 
W'b Hot, foulld ill the S3 bncket. Th f "b~tnl('liOTb t.hllt. we implemenu-d ciln be :;;cen in 
Appcndix A.3, 
5. 3 Conclusion 
This ('hapter de:;;cribed how the specifications dcocribed in tlw (,lmpt"r ,j WCf(, implemellt,cd. 
\Vc providc<l fmtl"' r rldai!., ,tb()llt. l.l", implc,,"'"tatlml of bot.h t.he dicllt and the server, 
\ Ve diSi'lL.,,.,d U,,' impl"m"Hl at.iml of t,he ,dgorithm~ aHd prct('edurfs, as well as described tiw 
dilfpH'llt. ('OIll pOllent,.'; t hilt, were implemenl.ed in accordancc wit]l thc [(~lui]{'rn"Ht goal..;. \ \'(, 
then di8('us:sed how the server ",a., imlJkmI'm"rI and l )", 'iellrdLi1ble um,rypt.ion functionalit.\ 
of the svstem i1S wdl ,k~ tlw ditTerI'm p'mmlct,('r~ nef'ded. Lm;tly we discussed Liw .JelS3t 












The purpose of the testing chapter is to (l.~<.ess whether 1 he illlpielllelll.Mioll 11H8 Hddressed 
the rcXjnir(,IIH'lll$ ~ p,'Cifi('d j]j :WCtic)JJ 3 hnd mef\sure the p.:rfonnance and storage owr-
heads. To achiew this we pertOfll1ed H set of tests for {·ct"h of t.he fnlldi()l1~ bl",cifi"d ill I.lw 
H'~lllin'[j"'lll. s. \\'" t.h('u measured how long it took to secure data. the stowge (fI'erh ell-d of 
","curill!!; t,lle data, 1.h" tilll!' tak!'Il to "pload ,bla llIls('cnrC'iy ,'er~ll~ ~"curdy. and lasti." we 
me3Sured the time wken to exe<'ute q\lerie~ at wt], t.he cliell! (l.nd the SerWL 
6.1 Configuration 
The client testing was performed on a imel@ Core'''2 Duo CPU TSH)() 'Q 2.lOGHz \\'ith 
2004r.lb of "''''mory rnulling I he UbnIl1ll J(l.()'l rejea~('. The E('2 ill~1 11Ue" rn1111i111-\ th" s{n',"r 
appiicatioll W'k~ a Sm(11/ I'II.'[n,,('(; which h'k~ 1.7C,ll of lllC'llJOry, Ttl""ill!!; one F:C2 Computf 
Uml on tl. 32-Rit plat.j')£lll with ,\{olirmtf I/ O l'erfonmlllce. The Amazoll -"lachine Imf\ge 
used was ami·S39ca9J,7 runn ing in the fu-west-l )"(',q!on. 
6.2 Functional Testing 
As explained in Sec tion 3 I. there Me a uumber of d,,~i~u erikri" n'qnir~mellt' thtl.t need 
to be ~al.isfled for a secure file stomg" bj'bt€lll The tl.illl ih to test whether the desigll of the 
R\'stem Call I", illJpl("lll"llkd and tilat it ill hut stl.ti~fies the rcquiremem s at a functioual 










6 .2.1 File Sharillg 
Fil~ ~haring functionality mpaJ1S that tllP own~r of th~ lilp is able to grant oth~r users 
permi&oions to read or modify tllP con(.pnt~ of th~ data. In order to tE'St this, a Sl'parate / 
~lilnd-illOl)(' llser key-pair wa", (n"tLe,1 [or 'Bob' ann the following steps were performer!. 
FSl 
l. File Owne!. Abce, creates nell' SKure File Object and in~erts data 
2, Cw;lIc a new Li"-] k"y plJ.ir [or Bob, 
;;, I30b 10[';' in ,uln tries to access data of the new SKnre File Object, howewr I30b is 
unahlp to a("CPss the datH. ~inC<' }\IiC">" hils ILOI, grHlll.pd him rPfld "CCP~S right~. 
4 Alice adds" rpad Utipr pntr), for Boh . 
. 'J. Bob triE'S to H(,C<'S.5 Ihe dHta agHin and is "OW ahl~ to sincp he ha~ flC(,P~S to hp File 
Encryption Ke~', 
Similarly WP had to tE'St tlw "'rite accPbS functionality, for this we usenlJob's key-pair 
again with the followin[,; steps, it is also as.511111ed that jJ.ob aln-any ha., rmd ;11"""~ righl~. 
The [ollowiILr', s1."P~ 1' ''1. wheliH'r jJ.ob'" il\<"[';a[ ('hallge~ mIL)'" idelLtilied. 
FS2 
1. File O""llPr, Alice, creates nell' SflCHre File Object and ill""r1.s dalCl. 
2. Soh 10gb in and modifies lhe daw, widwLIl ha\'inr', wril.e p<-f]llbsiom. 
3. Boh thPll sign~ the changes "ilh his private key and SNS the la"1. ]Jlodilied users value 
tn his \D, 











<~, Alice then I()()h up G()bs public kC,1 "Illr} which duel'; flOt havc thc Wrile J1!t~ i',C1. 
The following k~t chl'rks the "nOTlllal Row of' l'wlIts", W)l('Te Rob ha.-. writ.<, ,leU_ 
ulld le~ililll!ttel} ch!tng"'8 I.lw d!tLt 
rS3 
l. File Owner, Alio:c , cIcala; new Socme File Object !tnd inserts data. 
2 .. \lice gmm~ l3()h writ • ." 1~'rmissioIiS , 
:J. Bob log~ in ""d lll()difie~ 1.10(' (b l.a. 
~. Bob thelll';igns the changes with his private key al]d h!t~ the last modified users value 
1,0 his ]D, 
u. Alire log~ in 100d dwr h rloe b,t modifil'd u,",,'r i~ >;d to Bah. Alice looks ups Bobs 
public kiT and uses thiE w decrypt the ~igll ( ~j data hash f\lld determinc t h ~ int e~rit.l' . 
Thl' t"~tE ha\"" been performed to det ermine whelher thc fi le l';h!tr iug f,mni()Wlli IY 
oorrect ly shul"~s di.ta betWe€ll uO€rE. From I.h~ I,CSil'; lYO' c!tn dcdll{'c tlo"l, ()ur ~dl('n'" i~ 
Successful. 
0.2.2 K ey-Revocation 
When" U';0r i~ no longer aliO\H'd to read the contents of it ~cun' File Objoct , rlmt m;f'r 
mml, be r< 'moV('d from the ]"('ad-list and ll€" Fil ~ Ell! nptioli Ke\'~ nlLlst hc gen(Tal.ed Th( ' 











,.1, li,,~ neatf"j a "ew S(~.'m" File Ol,ject and inserts data, 
2, i"'lice grant~ Bob r~ad perm;ssio"o, 
:;, 30b logs in and ran decrypt, and read rhp data. 
1 Alic" t.hen ]('vokes Bob's read lJ€rmi%iollS, 
5, Bob ~an no longer decrypt t,h(' ('()JLL<'''t..~ of th(' data field, 
FrOll1 tillS test we can ,leduC€ that our s~heme i~ Sllccessfid in pro\-iding I\~y­
n'vocat iolL functionality, 
6.2 .3 Compromised K ey-pair 
A compromiS€d key-pair m~alL~ that. a u~"r'~ kPv-l'air ('am,,,t be t.rust.ed allymore This 
implies that the data neecb to be re-ennyptM, To test thb functionality we performed the 
f()jj()win~ stepo, 
CKI 
J. Alir(' (T"at('s a lL(,W S<)('ure Fii<- Object, alld illfiert,~ dat.a 
2. Alire grams Hob rpad lwrmissiolls . 
3 Hob~ key-pair is do:€med compromised thus a new key-pair is g('rlCmted, 
4. R~\'oke Robs arces.;; rights. By doin~ this step, a W'W File ElLcrypt.io" Key(FEK) 
is ~en('r"t('d m,d the data i" m'-<'Jl(TYl'jpd. The Uber~ with read permissiolls. excel';' 
Hob, 8re th~n given the n~'" FEE b} el1nyplin~ the FEK with th"ir Fllbik Key~ 
5, TIle last ~L<'p i~ 10 re-ndd Hob a., a read user with his uew key-pair, tllis re~Hllts in 











ti .2A C Ol I fi d cnt.iality 
C I 
I. ('m,'" E",pt~· &ot:: ure Pile O OJf'ct wit h block ~'!I cn ptiOll dlsa],],.:.! 
2 Lood «Jutents 
.J &rializc the object to a fu~ 
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The output fro]1l t h" hex edil.Dr i~ showll in Fig-liTe 6.1. 'J'll{' figlU!' ~hows that it i~ 
~RSy to eXiunine the content,s o[ a st<rialized obj~t. Vlie then lle€<bl to Lcst whe l,h~r our 
,{'hmw would be abl~ 1:0 keep dllt~ ('J)ntid"nt,inl, Hnd this WM acheived wiIh followi ng st"l'" 
C2 
l. ('reate Empiy Secure Filp Obj"ct. wit.h blo('k ,'llcryption ~llabled 
2 Load ('onl{~lts 
.3 Seriidi,-" th" oi>j,'d 1,0 a file 
4, Open ~erialiD€d fil~ with ~ t ext "lit.m 
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The output from th~ hex e,htor i~ showll in figure {j,2 . This time it i~ nOI pos~ibl~ to 











Secure File Object integrity is important in identifying whether a file has been tampered 
with. To test whether our scheme can detect loss of integrity we performed the following 
steps. 
II 
1. Alice creates a new Secure File Objects, loads data and creates a signed hash. 
2. Alice then makes a change but does not generate a new signed hash. 
3. Alice then executes the "check integrity" command which generates a hash of the 
current data and compares it with the hash that is stored with the Secure File Object. 
4. Since the hashes differ, that means that there has been a changes to the data. 
This test has shown that our scheme can successfully detect losses in integrity. 
6.2.6 Searchability 
One of the key features of this system is allowing users to search for keywords that are 
attached to encrypted files stored on S3. To test this functionality, a number of files where 
created with overlapping keywords attached. 
81 
\\'e hard coded that Filel will have Keywordl,Keyword2,Keyword3 
File2 will have Keyword2,Keyword4,Keyword5 











Function Fulfilled Notes 
User Functions 
File Sharing Yes Correctly allows users to have different access rights. 
Tests: FSi, FS2, FSS 
Key-Revocation Yes Correctly removes a users with read rights. Test: KRi 
Compromised Key-pair Yes Simulated by doing a key revoke followed by re-adding 
that users rights. Test: GKi 
I System Functions 
Confidentiali ty Yes Keeps data confidential when stored. Tests: Gl, G2 
Integrity Yes Identifies when a file has been tampered with. Test: I1 
Searchabili ty Yes Correctly returns the files containing the specified key-
words. Test: Sl 
Table 6.1: Functional Specification Testing, shows the functions as defined in the 
Design Requirements Chapter and summarizes the results. 
\Ve then submitted a query for keyword5 and knew that File2 and File3 had to be 
returned as results, similarly keyword2 returned File1 and File2. \Ve ran these tests and 
the results we received were the ones that were anticipated. 












File Size %Encryption Time %Data Sign %Object Sign Total Time (ms) 
1Kb 35.63 3l.42 32.95 13.05 
10Kb 37.82 30.18 32 13.75 
100Kb 54.32 22.27 23.41 22 
1Mb 75.19 10.16 14.65 97.95 
10Mb 76.67 6.83 16.5 934.75 
Table 6.2: File Encryption, Data Signing and Object signing times 
6.3 Performance Testing 
It is important to know whether a system works at a functional level, but equally important 
to determine how well the system works from a performance perspective. vVith a file storage 
system, it "v'Ould not be practical for it to take up a lot of time to perform basic file system 
operations such as save or retrieve. For this reason it is important to check what overhead 
such a system adds. 
6.3.1 Encryption Time 
The time the system takes to encrypt is important as this indicates how long a user has 
to wait while the system is doing the processing. This test involved looking at how long it 
takes to encrypt the data, how long it takes to sign the data and how long it takes to sign 
the whole object to ensure the performance overhead of securing an object is tolerable. 
The data is displayed in Table 6.2 showing the time taken for each operation as a percentage 
of the total time. The input files are of sizes 1Kb, 10Kb, 100Kb, l~lb and 10Mb. To test 
this we performed the following steps. 
l. Create an empty Secure File Object. 
2. Load contents and measure the length of time taken by this operation. 












1. Cen("rate a "ign""l ha,h of t.hf enti re Securf File Object and measlu'e the kn~th of 
t.ill1e takfll by thi~ operatioll. 
This proces, is illllstrat,xl in F'igllw ri .:;' 
t ·· .... ;· () 0 H \~i " 3, 
I I II 
"eme ~ Ie O*:t Se: lXe Fie Dbrcl ~(U" Rle C/t'ii'G SeclXe me~JJl'Ct 
a:,;;: 




Hdlh .mj H",h ~n-l 
Sign Data 





Figlll'e G,~: The figllre sholl's the steps ill measllring Ul(" ,·llcry pt.ioll tim" of a s,'('m" 
File OlJj ect . The first step is to meaSlire th,' time t.ak("n t,o ("Jl('[ypt t h" 
daLa, t.1", ,,("xt. ' [."1' j , to Ill('"snJ'( ' t.h(" time taken t.o gfllfrate a ~ignN 
hash of the data and la~tly thf tillle taken to generate a signed hash of 
the Socure Fi lf Objoct_ 
0. 3.2 File Size Overhead 
I 
wil l in('nf. To det€nnine thf>;€ oWfhea£l~ we looked at a large llllml",r files of '<lryillg Ji](" 










For €ach input file an SFO was created. The input was €ncrypted USiIl~ DES and 
6tol'<'d wi thill tIl(' S FO. Th" si/J'S of t h" "ilriollS static 1 fidds within t h" SFO "we JL",aSllr('(1 
\\'€ limit€d th€ numbl'f of k€y".-o[(b tn five using key",'()rds of five charact.)rs in length, The 
filename size was also tixed at 9 characters, Th€ toLel ,;latic overhead for each file was 
902 hyt('s l'<'gilfd]"ss of tlJ(' inpill fik siw. The DES ,dgorithm uscs p;"lding whm doillg 
its encryption, meaning that encrypt.ing som€ input added an additional 0 to 8 b}i<"s of 
m'erhead dependillg on the number of blocks. Figure 6.4 ShOII'6 the security overhead as a 
perc€nlag€ of t.Il€ illPut. fil€. As i,.; ,.;hown in thp gmph, th€ m·"rh""d 11<'{:<.lJl'''S n"gligibl" as 
the inpnt size m;cee<:b J()Okb, 
0 .3.3 Secu r e Put vs UnSeCltl 'e Put 
Another u ... .,ful ted i6 io assume that users are alrea.dy using cloud 6tomge, For 11~efS 
alr""dv Ilsin~ dowl stor;o.gp, w" t,."st(,,] tIl<' overlwads that suel! u,'\('rs would ('xJ,,'ri"nl" 
using our impl€nwntati"Tl The t<",.;1, <:<!Tlsist€d of cr€ating an SFO with n,rying input siz€s 
and uplondiug these SFOs to the cloud storage sen'ice. The tile si/.€s tested were ll{h, 
10K!>, lOOk!>, lIdb ,md J011b ilS is showu ill Fi~llrc (i,:U, l'lJ(' fil(~6pt Ilplw)(l WilS H'pmt('(i 
30 tim€s flnd th€ t.ime shown in Figure 6.3,:) is t,he awrag<'d tim€, Th€ upload was rej:l<'ated 
:lO limfS,;,o a" to sl1looth the ebln due to changes iunetwork iatpuei"s. 
Figllre 6.3.3 shows tIl<' time t.ak('n 10 UplOfld th€ files 1,0 a cloud provider from a client, 
it abo ,.;how, th~ t im€ taken to uploa.d 1.h€ file' from E,C2 to S3 
6.3.4 Se<'llTIt (.ime 
To te"t th€ seflrch time we had considered a number of I}{,Imulfltions of ill(' numfx:1' of 
files flIld the number of keywords l}{']' tile, for em'll l:>ermlltiltioll, a llUBI!>"r of It.:b lil~, 
were Ilploadpd with a1ll1ml",r of kp):words "tbd",d. Thp keywords u,."d W€re tak€n from a 
1,.\ Slntic field b a field ... 1><>6< d"",n', change ",hen Uw input i, dlanged or d"", not add to the ""cmil}, 
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Fignn' 6.1' T)w physic"l '1,0['4;" ""!'rhead ''''1'n",<"('d a~ a l'ercelll.ag€ of the input 
file ",il~ _ It it< shown that as the fil~ siz€~ ar€ increa~ed then the on'rhead 
becomes negligIble. 
dictionary thell stored in a list to be Ilsed for th" query. Ouce Ilploaded th" sys lelll KClllid 
then IauriOll1jy sc[,,("t a k,,:,,'w()rd [rom th" otOIcd lisl and "u1>m;l, il. to I.h" EC2 i;('[\·ice. The 
EC2 ",[vie" I.hc" performed" scan,h I.hnmgh all dH' file" in the S3 h\l~kel, rNurning the 
mat~hes . figure G.J ",hOWl; an owrview, at an architectural level, of the tests perfomml. 
Cli""i l'erf()rmimCC 
I" l·esting the dient performance. we upJr,aded a llulllb<,r of files each with a stat;" number 
of keywords al,l.ad,,,d alld d,e]) t("'<ted the re;pOll5e time, this ww repeated 30 times. !'uch 
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periods of time for a response from the server, 
" Ayg5e(nCiF.fi: 
Avg c·,>eel" cc:n 
"A'iq I, 1xW! SJ 
-Av~5e(u'!S< 
The resn]ts of this I.:SI, are shown in Figure (j.(j , The !-\taph shows how til(' wspom;<: Ii"", 
i"cr~as,'" as the llumber 01' files iu an S3 bllCkN i!lrr ~ases . The r~a.'>On for the drastic increaoe 
in response time between forty tiles alld one hnndrro files is dne to n('[.work lal."uci,>; wi , hill 
Amazoll's lIlh·'~'l.nj(' I. 11l'<' wll('u dowuloadillg "11" IlllIldf('d k""word" fi l ~ trom 83 to Ee2 as 
opposed 1:0 ollly downloading fony tile8_ 
Server Performance 
Although tesl.mg Ihe di,'llI. p"rformaJ](" is Il(',>ded I.() ""amill" how I()ug Hs"rs ,,,,'I,d 1:0 wai, 
[or T"SPOIlSl:S, i, d')("Il ' I. acrHral,,'lv show til(' ]H'l'torItlHlKe of ,h~ oeal'rh algorithm. Ab the 
Illlllll",r of k"yword, incl'ea""," the ro:><pom;e t ime remain8 COll8tant thi:, b be(:ause the di[· 











Cllen! Side Con'pute Cloud IE(1) 
Scnd"O ~ K",,.~d '0 c""'pu'o <Iou" 
v,. ycr'o,'" 
(C" ' ~;,",''' O'')- ~ 
, '"".e,',,_ 
r 
, .,".,,, - ~.y '''>' d . 
to "o. O<J' 50"" " 
Sto'''g'' Cloud (S3) 
Figur~ 6_5: Th~ test en"ironm~nt overview for the t€ , ting performed "t the client 
and th€ l'erwr, There needs to he two levels of testing, fwm tbe di"nt 
i'ide ,md fro m the sen-€l' i'ide. The dient I' ide ind",jes lal.{~lCy i,Stl(S 
m,d exalHiI"'~ bow IOllg a cil('1I1. Im<, to wail. foT' a ~('arcb query re>po11'e_ 
')'be s<'r\'('r oi(1<, (,X"JHlIl('S IIL € perfoT'lllallcr of I.he actual S€arch quer), 
eliminat ing latency i"ue, 
as I.he number of ke),Y,rord> increaS€> we duwnlow:ied hilihe files from 83 llltO hll army in 
lhe ECl instan('e's memory, thus removing b,l en('y ii' suei' a.nd red udng the nnmber of p'l,<I;e 
fanlt" thai ('(mid (K'(,ur by 11~ing ol,her d".1,,, ~l.r11<"1 , llT'('~ Oll('e 1. 11" ti l€> w~r~ ill memory the 
applinll.ion il,,,nl.l,,,d o\-!'[ Ih" tik~ "","'11I,illg Ihe "'arel, fnll cl.ion on each it~m, 
're initiall,' stn.rte(llhe t esting by ll sing" di( ,tionary to sded l.lw nlIldOllL keyword> 
I hill were al.l ,,,.:::he<i to t h€ Secnre Fi le Obj~cb_ TILe raIldom hywords w€re then mved to " 
tile i'O that we could use them li1t~r for the the seim'h , The tesl, would randomly ,,"]()(' I, a 
fil~ from the "USN keywords" file hnd mbmit I.his 1,0 the EC2 insl aJl('(" I hi~ """,, T'epeal ,,,j 
Iwenty Limes. The Sen-cr, nllming on I,he E('2 iIlst,iUlC" , would t hen mea'ure OO\\' long 
it lo.,k to il,('mtc ,'\U "aclL keywoT'd withiu eaclL fil~_ T hes€ firsl te,ts were timed .Li'ing 
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- 100 FI'es 
Fi";l1H' 6,G: 'I'll(' a"enl!'," lim" l,aJ"," for a di(,IlI 10 gd resl1lt~ hack from the "",rver 
applkation_ Tlw graph ~how~ the tim~ t akpn for varying numbers of 
file:, stored in lin S3 hl1ckct and varying numbers of hvwords. 
Thf problem wit h doing t\\'eIlty Iterations of fach test ca:oe Wab that \\'e \wre getting 
some unexplainablt, result.s when cDmparing the actual rt'sults with l,l](' I.lworeli('al allalvsis 
of the al,.;oridull, \\'(' 1I",n dedded 1,0 l,rv llaIH"""'OIld pr('c:isioll Whfll doiIlg the twenty it-
erat iOllS of the t~st cas~s, sinc~ some of tlw re,ults we were g(,tting were in sub-millisecond 
pt'rformllnce, However as shown in Figure (j,8 there wef(' still unexplainabl(' n,,,,its <XJmiIlg 
from Ill('se leSIS. 'I' ll(' moSl, obvi,ms a11O",,,I:-' is when, d](' perf{)rlllaIlC ~ g~ts bettfr from 100 
files with ,50 k~yword~ to 100 fil~s with 100 kpywords. Ohviously !j000 compare opt'fations 
slJ(mid lake less tim~ to complpte t han 100011 For this reabOll \\'f decidE'C1 to perform 100 
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Figun.' 6i T hi,; hgur .. :;ho"'~ lhp p,·rf(.rmflnce de~mdaLi"n uf ,.,,,yin;:. tIl<' Il' "uh~r 
of kevuurrn ror II rLX e-d nUiuber (.r nk". when, ",,1\- 10 it(>ratiQn~ \n;~J"f' 
dr,"e. 
Figllr~ 6,9 and a~ can be se~n the~'I\l e fl.id~· diITer~lll 10 Ih" I.w"my ",'tst. .. :>n r~'\llt~. An 
otlwr chnuge I,ha l. waS ffiHd" ""~, I c. h ,k f",. h ,'''''ord' that. w~rp not u'<ed wlwn C!"~(l i ing Illl' 
w"t 1".\ Tili, W!l1l ld tor{"p rlo .. a lgonthm 10 perinl'm cnmlJare "JwmLlmt._ .. ,, .,)1 h,.word, 
ill 311 hl~ a.~ 01'PObed 10 se'lIclJinp. Ihr"lIl':h tht' k''''"uro ls "f a fil,- 1mdl II mllleh i~ t'ound 
thll~ lhting L1 ,e wor~1 ,."so· 
Itcferring hack to th .. u.e~ ot"<'t> ";:.>11 II. It tiluoi,- ;""r\'i(~, nHJld storp "'"~1( hie; in folders 
1,;\-00 Oll the art"t SCI il ,,,,,8 b i.ll .. ,.,1,'1<> .~ .... ",up that you cDulrl j!:et foid<.'L'li "lIh ((I ni,>; 
or even up i{) JIM) files , We 'nil\, m,'IUW' that "" a. ,><'r'0lll1.1 computeI', in geur!0111l;i:'f" will 
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Figllre 6.8: Thi, iiglmc shows the p€rformatlC€ degradat.ion when doing 20 i1(,nl-
t.ions of each 11'" cas" wiLl! Il<Ul()s<'Coud precisioll, note the anomaly 
happening from 100 files with 50 k{·.\'·w()]d~ 10 lOll iile~ with 1011 ke,I'-
words 
s". ,,," r .. ,~. 
-
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-
Fi[:';urc (i .9: Thi~ fi~Ul'e show~ t he per [ormrulc;c degradation of varying tlw !lumber of 
keywords for a fix ed llllmllel' of files, where the test eases w~re rep.catro 
lOll Liaws with llill.j(~Jlld precision ru, "-ell as tebt.ing the worst C8.."€ 











6.4 Deployment Case Study 
As described in Section 5.1.1, the client running on the users computer is able to accept 
commands via a socket interface from other applications that \vish to upload data securely 
to the cloud. In order to test that this we decided to use the Linux email client Alpine to 
interface with the client interface and back-up an email securely to Amazon S3. 
This was achieved by writing a Python script that accepts all the arguments given 
by Alpine through stdin. The script parsed the arguments for the subject of the email 
and then wrote the arguments to a temporary file. The script then connect to the client 
interface via a socket and sends a list of commands in the same format as specified in 
Section 5.1.1 and then passed the arguments to the "sendmail" application in /usr /sbin/ 
to send the email. The final step was to make Alpine execute this script, this was achieved 
by modifying the .pinerc configuration file, in the home directory, which is used by Alpine. 
\\'e had to change the 'sendmail-path' in the configuration file to use our custom script 
instead of the default one. The overview of the different communicating components is 
illustrated in Figure 6.10 
In implementing an interface for other applications we have been able to demonstrate 
t he this system can be used as the use cases specified in Section 3. The communication 
between other applications and our implementation happen with the use of unencrypted 
sockets. There is no reason to encr?pt the communication bebveen an email client and our 
application since the communicatic·n is happening on the users computer which is assumed 
to be secure. Connecting Alpine with our application was a relatively simple task requiring 
a script with a few lines of code and one modification of the configuration file that is used 
b~' Alpine. 
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Figure 6.10: The Figure illustrates the overview of the Deployment case study and 
how Alpine was used to communicate with our implementation to 
achieve a secure backup on S3. 
to interface with the client. In our testing we did not need to recompile the application 
that was interfacing with our client. Even if it were necessary to modify the source code, 
these would be minor changes since all that is required is to open a socket and send across 











6. 5 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to test the functional and performance dimensions of the implementa-
tion. At a functional level, high level functionality was tested such as whether the data is 
confidential, can the implementation detect unauthorized changes to data, does the search 
functionality work correctly, can file owners share data and managed user keys and lastly 
can the implementation recover from a compromised key-pair. At a more detailed level, 
t he performance of the functionality was tested using different parameters. This meant 
observing the time it took to encrypt files of various sizes, examining the security over-
head of the design, the time taken to upload files securely versus unsecurely as well as the 
time taken to respond to search queries using varying numbers of files and keywords. This 
chapter has shown that the design of such a system can be implemented and satisfies all 
the design requirements. To end the chapter we performed a case study illustrating how 
the Linux email client, Alpine, was modified to interface with our client to provide secure 
cloud back-up functionalitly. The case study showed that providing such functionality to 














In the previous chapter, we tested our implementation at both functional and performance 
levels. The chapter considered whether the implementation succeeded in meeting the de-
sign requirements as specified in the Section 3 and how this functionality performed using 
different parameters. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the results. \Ve assess the implication of 
successfully implementing all the requirements at a functional level. The performance of 
these functions is then analyzed starting with the Encryption Time, File Size Overhead, 
Secure and Unsecure Puts and Search functionality of the system. \Ve then go on to discuss 
the Current Approach of our solution and the success of using this approach. We then 
analyze our results with reference to the use cases specified in Section 3 and we conclude 
the chapter by discussing the Client Interface. 
7.1 Functionality 
\Ve tested the system at a functiona level to assess whether the implementation has satified 
the requirments specified in Section 3.1. based on the testing performed in Chapter 6, it is 
asserted that at our implementation successfully fulfills the requirements. 
The reader should recall that were introduced in Chapter 3 as an adaptation of the 
list of requirements that are (leeded by a security storage system as specified by V.Ker 













It is important to test whether a design can be successfully implemented but equally im-
portant is to test how well the implementation performed. For this reason the system was 
exercised under various load functional conditions and tested how long various operations 
took to complete. Tests considered how long it took for data to be encrypted and signed, 
the size of the security overhead that was added, the time it took to upload a file to the 
cloud with and without security and lastly the time it took for the implementation to 
process search queries. 
7.2.1 Encryption Time 
In order to examine the performance of the encryption time we looked at three operations 
that would ensure that the data has been secured. 
1. Loading the data from a file and encrypting it using the DES encryption algorithm. 
2. Hashing the encrypted data and signing it with the file owner's private key 
3. Generating a hash of the entire Secure File Object and signing that with the owners 
private key 
vVe measured the time taken for each of these operations and expressed them as a 
percentage of the total time taken to perform all three operations. The data is displayed 
in Table 6.2 and is shown in Figure 7.1. The table shows that the time taken to perform 
all three operations took 13.05 ms on file of 1Kb in size, with roughly a third of the time 
being used for each operation, similarly for a file with 10Kb. This changes for file sizes 
greater than 10Kb where the dominant operation is encryption. This is too be expected 
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is used by DES for padding. The total security overhead never exceeds 910 bytes. This 
makes the system efficient when using file sizes of more the 10Kb by adding less than 1% 
in overheads. This is assuming that there is only one read / ,vrite user. To add a read 
users means adding an entry to the read list which adds an additional 136 bytes per entry 
and 171 bytes for an entry in the Public Key list. 
Such overhead can seem reasonable when looking at the use cases specified in Sec-
tion 3. An emailing system that backs-up files to S3, a 902 Byte overhead would not be 
significant given that such a file would have a number of emails contained with in, which 
can easily grow larger than 10Kb. The sample saved message that is used by Alpine 1 is 
roughly 500 bytes for the header and 3 lines of text. For this system to provide an under 
10% overhead we would need 2 of these sample emails. In the case of a Dropbox type of 
an application. users would upload general documents, to media files. All of which can be 
range from BIb through to 1Gb in size resulting in an insignificant overhead. 
The music system use-case would also result in a less than 1% security overhead, this is 
because a typical mp32 song of length 4 minutes is roughly 5.l\ilb in size. An overhead of 
902 bytes for a file that is 5Mb big results in an overhead of less than 0.018%. 
7.2.3 Secure Put vs Unsecure Put 
The reason for testing Secure Put versus Unsecure Puts is to examine the overhead this 
system would place 011 users already using the cloud, specifically S3, to store their docu-
ments. It did not make sense to look compare the performances of local storage with that 
of cloud storage since these two will obviously differ greatly due to network transfer speeds. 
Figure 6.3.3 shows the time it takes to upload from the client to EC2, these are the Avg 
Secure and Avg Unsecure values. The next step was to examine how long it takes to upload 
from EC2 to S3, these are the Avg Secure 83 and Avg Unsecure 53. 












As is shown in the graph, the Avg Secure and Avg Unsecure values follow closely together, 
this is because the time taken to upload a 10Kb and a 10Kb + 902b file are very similar. 
The only differences that affect the values are the changes in network load and latencies 
which makes it difficult to determine the exact meaning of the slight differences because 
there are network changes happening in the local network as well as within the Amazon 
\Veb Services network. It is important to note that the difference in uploading a file with 
this security scheme and without scheme is small. In the case of the 10Mb file, it was a 14% 
increase in upload time, whilst in the the case of the 1Kb file it was only a 0.5% increase. 
7.2.4 Search 
In testing the performance of the search functionality, we broke it dmvn into two broad 
categories. The search as seen from the clients perspective, with network latencies, and the 
performance at the server, done in such a way so as to eliminate network latencies and to 
simply capture the time the actual search took. This was achieved by loading all keyword 
files into memory from a given bucket, then timing how long it takes to iterate over all the 
items to find the matches. 
Client 
The client data is displayed in Figure 6.6. As is shown, from the clients perspective, the 
number of keyvv'Ords attached to the files doesn't degrade the performance of the search. 
The only significant contributor to performance degradation is the number of files in a 
given bucket. It can be seen from the graph that as the number of files increases so does 
the the response time, nearly proportionally. The increase from 40 files to 100 file is an 
increase of 150% in the number of files and the response time increases by 133%. Similarly 
the increase from 20 files to 40 files is a 100% increase in the number of files and the 











t he server running on the EC2 instance needs to download the keyword files off S3, if there 
are 100 files it needs to download 100 keyword files. The latency from the client to the 
server remains fairly constant so it is this downloading from S3 which slows down response 
times. 
Let us apply these results to our emailing use case as explained in Section 3. Should 
this emailing system have 40 files in an S3 bucket and it decides to submit a query, it will 
take roughly 15 seconds for it to receive a response from the server regardless if there is 
one keyword per email or 100. 
Server 
Although it is useful to look at client response times, as mentioned these results include 
lletwork latencies which do tamper with the search response times. For this reason we 
decided to test the efficiency of the search algorithm without any external influences. 
The results of the testing are shown in Figure 6.9, Figures 6.7 and Figures 6.8. Fig-
ure 6.7 displays the results when fixing the number of files but increasing the number of 
keywords using millisecond precision and 20 iterations. Figures 6.8 shows the results of 
using nanosecond precision with 20 iterations whilst shows the results of using nanosecond 
precision with 100 iterations Figure 6.9. 
Algorithm Complexity The algorithm has a worst case complexity of O(KN), where 
K is the number of keywords per file and N is the number of files. A simple check shows 
us that using 20 iterations with millisecond precision Table 7.1 gave incorrect results. If 
we look at the performance of 100 files with 10 keywords this results in 0(1000) search 
operations, which resulted in about 19 milliseconds of computation. If we look at the re-
sults of 40 files and 100 keyworc.:; this result.s in 0(4000) search operations with a similar 











Parameters Operations Theoretical (ms) Actual (ms) 
20 Iterations, Millisecond precision. Baseline 0.25. 
10 Files 100 Keywords 1000 250 4.4 
100 Files 10 Keywords 1000 250 18.55 
40 Files 100 Keywords 4000 1000 19.05 
100 Files 50 Keywords 5000 1250 75.6 
100 Files 100 Keywords 10000 2500 87.75 
Table 7.1: This table shows the performance of executing 20 iterations with mil-
lisecond precision. 
search operations. We then tried to perform the testing using nanosecond precision with 20 
iterations but this also gave strange results most obviously the drop in search time with 100 
files and 50 keywords to 100 keywords. It again seemed strange that 5000 search operations 
took longer than 10000 search operations. The reason for this could not have been due to 
page faults in memory since all keyword files were stored in an array, the probability of 
page faults was small. The reason for this noisy data is that there are a lot of underlying 
operations happening behind the scenes such as garbage collection, context switches and 
other Java / operating systems tasks. For this reason we decided to do more iterations 
of each test case to get less noisy data. These results are shown in Figure 6.9, where the 
results are more intuitevely what we would expect. 
\\1hen examining Figure 6.9, we notice that these results are more appropriate and 
are closer to the theoretical analysis. With these new results, we notice that 100 files with 
10 keywords each takes approximately 20 milliseconds where as 40 files with 100 keywords 
is approximately 80 milliseconds. This seemed intuitively correct since 4 times the number 
of compare operations should take roughly 4 times the amount of time. Our predictions 











Parameters Operations Theoretical (ms) Actual (ms) 
20 Iterations, Nanosecond precision. Baseline 0.066. 
10 Files 100 Keywords 1000 66 2.94 
100 Files 10 Keywords 1000 66 8.16 
40 Files 100 Keywords 4000 264 20.54 
100 Files 50 Keywords 5000 330 76.73 
100 Files 100 Keywords 10000 660 72.06 
Table 7.2: This table shows the performance of executing 20 iterations with 
nanosecond precision. 
Testing with 20 iterations and millisecond preCISIOn When performing 20 itera-
tions with millisecond accuracy our baseline was 0.25 milliseconds, the baseline is where 
t here is only one file with one keyword. The baseline when using nanosecond precision and 
20 iterations was 0.066 milliseconds and 0.032 for the 100 iterations results. A comparison 
of the actual results versus the theoretical results are shown in Table 7.1. The theoretical 
results are simply the baseline multiplied by the number of comparison operations. As 
can be seen, there is a large difference between the theoretical and actual results in the 20 
iteration millisecond precision results. There is also a large difference between the search 
queries for 10 Files 100 Keywords and 100 Files 10 Keywords, both of which require 1000 
search operations. Similarly, the increase from 4000 operations to 5000 operations is only 
25% while the actual performance deteriorates by nearly 400%. 
Testing with 20 iterations and nanosecond precision When examining results of 
using nanosecond precision with 20 iterations, the results improve slightly in certain sit-
uations but are still far off the theoretical analysis as shown in Table 7.2. There is also 
all anomaly where 100 files with 100 keywords each performs better then 100 files with 











operations whereas the latter is only performing 5000 compare operations. 
Testing with 100 iterations and nanosecond precision The last set of results are by 
far the best, the theoretical performances match the actual results gathered far better than 
ill the other two tests as is shown in Table 7.3. As mentioned the number of operations 
logically affects the time taken to complete the search. The time taken to complete a search 
over 10 files with 100 keywords and a search over 100 files with 10 keywords is nearly the 
same, only a 37% difference, where this difference was over 300% and 200% for the other 
to tests. If we try to use the theoretical analysis along with the baseline to try and predict 
actual results, these predictions are much better than in the two other cases. If we try 
predict how long 10000 operations, we get a theoretical time of 320 milliseconds and the 
actual result is 335 milliseconds, only a 4% under estimate. \Vhereas the difference in the 
other two tests was a 2774% over estimate and a 816% over estimate. 
The conlusion of this discussion is that it is neccessary to perform at least 100 iter-
ations with nanosecond precision to have the actual results closely match the theoretical 
analysis. 
7.3 Use Cases 
An email client with the benefit of backed up storage in the cloud is considered a good 
test case for use with an SFO, in that around 10 keywords is seen as sufficient for folder / 
description. Similarly it is considered that this could also be appropriate for a file system or 
music library augmented with tags. These use-cases are well with in the design parameters. 
If each bucket has 100 SFO's with em ails as contents and 10 keywords each, then a query 











Parameters Operations Theoretical (ms) Actual (ms) 
100 Iterations, Nanosecond precision. Baseline 0.032. 
10 Files 100 Keywords 1000 32 13.3 
100 Files 10 Keywords 1000 32 18.3 
40 Files 100 Keywords 4000 128 84.95 
100 Files 50 Keywords 5000 160 117.49 
100 Files 100 Keywords 10000 320 335.13 
Table 7.3: This table shows the performance of executing 100 iterations with 
nanosecond precision. 
should the emailing application only need 5 keywords per file then queries will only take 
4.6 milliseconds, ultimately there will be a trade-off for each use case. 
7.4 Current Approach 
As mentioned in Section 4.5, the technique used to add secure searching is an adaptation of 
t he method used developed by Waters et al. [30]. In their symmetric approach, they stored 
the encryption key with each keyword entry in their audit log. This would mean that we 
would have to store the File Encryption Key with each keyword entry, which would be 
inefficient and incorrect since granting a user search access does not imply that the user 
should have access to the data. In our approach we replaced the key with another random 
bit string. In their paper they found that using their symmetric encryption scheme was not 
secure since if the audit log server was compromised thcn an adversary would have access to 
the secret key used in the secure keyword creatioll. This was not the case in our setting since 
the these secret keys are stored on the client, and are encrypted using the owners secret key. 
The structure of the Secure File Object was adapted from the data structure as us cd 











read / write access, key-revocations and perform integrity checks. The first list is the read 
access list and then there is a public key list that is used to perform integrity checks by 
retrieving the users public key and using it to decrypt the signed data hash. The method 
used by [12] is to have an entry for each user, if a user has write access then the private 
part of the File Signing key is stored. Storing multiple copies of the private part of any 
asymmetric key can be costly with regards to the space required. 
7.5 Approach success 
The approach was successful overall in that it fulfilled all the requirements that were iden-
tified in Section 3. This means that users are able to securely store data on a public cloud 
and detect whether there have been any unauthorized changes to the data. File Owners 
can also allow other users different levels of access to the data stored as well as revoke rights 
to certain users as is done on a traditional computer. The implementation also allows for 
users to search through encrypted data in such a way that the cloud provider is not able to 
determine the contents of the data stored. Thus from a functional level, the design removes 
the need for trust from a cloud provider. Where this approach lacks is in preventing ma-
licious users from deleting files or modifying files as discussed in Section 4.2.1. Should an 
adversary gain access to the account, then files can be deleted. This implementation can 
detect such action by storing a local file list and doing a reconciliation, however it cannot 
restore the deleted file or prevent file deletion. 
The searching functionality of the design also proved to be successful from both a 
functional level and a performance level. The implementation successfully found all files 
containing the keywords in a search. Our testing also managed to match up the theoretical 
model with the actual results to within 4% difference. \i\/here the searching would start to 











Files with 100 keywords would take approximately 8 hours to compute. However a more 
efficient indexing scheme would give far better performances for large datasets. 
7. 6 Conclusion 
This chapter set out analyze the implementation at both a functional and performance 
level. Our implementation has successfully fulfilled all the requirements that we set out 
to achieve as specified in Section 3. We have shown that the overheads incurred by these 
requirements are reasonable. As the size of a file increases, the dominant operation in 
securing the file becomes the encryption and we have shown this by encrypting a number 
of files with increasing size and graphically showing that as the file size increases so does the 
dominance of encrypting the data. Our implementation has a very small data overhead, 
only adding 910 bytes of data where there is only one user of the file. This results in 
less than 1% in data overheads for files greater than 10Kb. \Ve showed that, since there 
is a minimal increase in the data size when using our implementation, this meant that 
the time taken to upload a secure file and a non-secure file would be very similar. The 
search functionality of our implementation was then analyzed, we explained the reasons for 
performance degradation at both a client and server level, we also performed a theoretical 
analysis of our search algorithm and showed that our actual results converged closer to the 
theoretical prediction as we performed more iterations of the test cases. We then discussed 
the possible use cases of the system and how other applications can interface with it. And 
lastly we discussed how our approach has been adapted and differs from other techniques 
used in securing untrusted distributed storage systems, and then discussed the success of 












Conclusions and Future work 
The objective of the project was to design a system that would allow users to store data 
securely on a public cloud provider such as Amazon's \Veb Service, specifically Amazon's 
Simple Storage Service. \Ve also wanted to add the ability to search through encrypted 
data to return only the files that were relevant to the users needs. The reason for doing 
this is that there is a lack of trust in the security of cloud providers as stated by Armbrust 
et al in [1]. 
8.1 Summary of Approach 
\Ve started out by examining distributed storage and what techniques are used to secure 
distributed storage where the storage is not trusted since these techniques could be relevant 
to our project. We then studied the various research and techniques being used to allow 
for encryption with keyword search and found that Symmetric Encryption with Keyword 
search was most relevant to our needs. 
The next step was to list the requirements needed to make a storage system secure, 
and we found a survey that gave a concise list of requirements that we adapted to our 
setting. The requirements that needed to be fulfilled were for data Confidentiality, data 
Integrity, the ability for File Sharing, Key Revocation for removing read user access, the 
ability to recover from a Compromised Key-pair and lastly the need to search through 











\vhich ensured that only legitimate users were able to access the system. 
\,ye were able to fulfill these requirements with the use of a modified data structure 
that was adopted from Goh et a1. [12] for securing distributed storage systems, named Sirius, 
that we called the Secure File Object. This modified data structure fulfilled all the require-
ments except for Searchability. To fulfill the searchability requirement of the project we 
adapted the Symmetric Encryption with Keyword Search techniques developed by Waters 
et a1. in [30]. The data structure used for searchability, in our design was called SFO K ey-
words. At a high level each Secure File Object has an SFO keywords file object attached to 
it, which is used to store the keywords attached to the data. Should an encrypted keyword 
be submitted, the server only does the cryptographic computations on the SFO keywords 
files, returning the results where there is a match. 
\,ye then implemented a prototype in Java to run on a Linux system using a 1024bit 
RSA key pair per user. There is a client that handles all cryptographic operations on the 
users computer and there is a server which runs on a compute instance. This server accepts 
requests from the client and does the necessary computations for the search algorithm. Our 
data encryption was done using the DES encryption algorithm and we generated hashes 
of the encrypted data using MD5 for both the data fields and the Secure File Object as a 
\\"hole. 
This prototype was then used to perform testing which we then used to evaluate 
the success of the project. We found that the requirements were successfully fulfilled and 
the performance impact of fulfilling these requirements was acceptable. \,ye tested the 
performance impact these requirements had in terms of Data Encryption Time, File Size 
Overhead, Secure vs Unsecure Puts, the Client Interface and the Search Algorithm. The 
Search Algorithm was tested at both the client and the server. The client search testing 











testing was done in order to remove network latencies and transfer speeds to compare the 
theoretical analysis and the actual results that we were getting. \Ve found that our scheme 
has a very small space overhead of about a constant 910 bytes for our test cases. Since this 
overhead is so small the difference in uploading unsecure files versus using our scheme is also 
insignificant. The data encryption time increased linearly with the size of input data, which 
is expected, and the time taken to respond to search queries also increased with the number 
of search operations needed, also as expected. We found that our measurements needed to 
be performed with nanosecond precision. Initially we had twenty search iterations which 
provided us with limited accuracy in the results but as we increased these iterations to one 
hundred and beyond, the actual results started to converge with our theoretical analysis, 
to within 4% in some cases. The deviation in the low iteration range is considered to be 
due to the Java and Operating System internals which are disproportionately skewed in 
the case of few iterations. The results of the study are of significant since they highlight 
the fact the secure cloud storage with search functionality can be achieved. The searchable 
encryption algorthms can be applied in a cloud context and the performance testing and 
analysis can prove benefial to future research. 
8.2 Future Work 
There is further work to be done with this project. A study could be performed in the 
searching aspect of the system, more specifically querying functionality. At the moment 
the design performs a brute force scan across all the keywords within all the files. One 
could look at various indexing techniques that could be used in an encrypted setting to 
perform more efficient look ups. This could be extended to allow for range scans across the 
encrypted keywords using indexing techniques 
Another study could be performed to compare the performance of RSA and Eclypitic 












Another draw back of the system is that it is currently designed to encrypt/decrypt 
whole files. There is no ability to perform random access on a file. If a user wishes to modify 
a certain block of the file, then the entire file must be downloaded, decrypted, modified, 
encrypted and sent back into the cloud. Techniques could be used from secure distributed 
storage systems to overcome this issue. 
8.3 Meeting the Objectives 
\Ve stated that the hypothesis of the study was to design a solution that would allow 
users to securely store data on an untrusted public cloud provider, whilst allowing for 
encrypted keyword search. We set out evaluate this by ensuring that the secure storage 
requirements were met and performed the task of examining the overheads of securing data 
on a cloud provider as well as the performance overheads of adding encrypted searchability. 
\Ve performed the testing to evaluate the implementation of the requirements, and the 
impacts of them. Based on these tasks, we have found that our design proves to be efficient 
in both the storage overheads and the processing time added when searching through a 
small number of files and that all the requirements could be met. 
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A.I Secure File Object 
{ 
public class SecureFileObject implements Serializable 
private String secureFileObjectName; 
private String ownerUserID; 
private String lastModifiedUserID; 
private Map<String,byte[]> readList; 
private Map<String,UserPublicKeyListEntry> userPublicKeyList; 
private byte[] encryptedFileEncryptionKey; 
private byte[] ownersPublicKey; 
private byte[] signedSecureFileObjectHash; 
private byte[] encryptedKeywords; 
private byte[] encryptedData; 
private byte[] signedEncryptedDataHash; 
public SecureFileObject(String secureFileObjectName, String ownerUserID, 
String lastModifiedUserID, Map<String, byte[]> readList, 











byte[] encryptedFileEncryptionKey, byte[] ownersPublicKey) 
} 
A.2 Secure File Object Processor 
liThe class allows the user to manipulate a given SecureFileObject instance 
public class SecureFileObjectProcessor implements Serializable 
{ 
public SecureFileObject CreateSecureFileObject(String secureFileObjectName, 
String ownerUserID, 
String lastModifiedUserID, Key fileEncryptionKey, 
Key ownersPublicKey, Key ownersPrivateKey) 
public SecureFileObject CreateSecureFileObject(String secureFileObjectName, 
String ownerUserID, RSAPublicKey ownersPublicKey, 
RSAPrivateKey ownersPrivateKey ) 
public String GetSecureFileObjectName(SecureFileObject sfo) 
public void AddUserPublicKey(String UserID, Key UserPublicKey, 
boolean isWriter, SecureFileObject sfo) 
public void AddReadUser(String UserID, Key UserPublicKey, 
Key OwnerPrivateKey,SecureFileObject sfo) 
public boolean AddReadWriteUser(String UserID, Key UserPublicKey, 











public void RemoveReadUser(String UserID,Key OwnerPublicKey, 
Key OwnerPrivateKey,SecureFileObject sfo) 
public void RemoveReadWriteUser(String UserID,Key OwnerPublicKey, 
Key OwnerPrivateKey,SecureFileObject sfo) 
public byte[] HashSecureFileObject(SecureFileObject sfo) 
public byte[] HashEncryptedData(SecureFileObject sfo) 
public void SignAndHashSecureFileObject(Key OwnerPrivateKey, 
SecureFileObject sfo) 
public boolean SignAndHashEncryptedData(String UserID, 
Key PrivateKey,SecureFileObject sfo) 
public boolean VerifyEncryptedData(SecureFileObject sfo) 
public boolean VerifySecureFileObject(SecureFileObject sfo) 
public byte[] SignHash(byte[] hash, Key PrivateKey) 
public void SetData(byte[] data, String UserID,Key UserPrivateKey, 
SecureFileObject sfo) 
public long SetDataFromFile(File f,String UserID, 












public byte[J GetData(String UserID, Key UserPrivateKey,SecureFileObject sfo) 
public void SaveDataToFile(File f,String UserID, Key UserPrivateKey, 
SecureFileObject sfo) 
public void ListUsers(SecureFileObject sfo) 
A.3 AmazonS3 
public class ArnazonS3 
{ 
private String rnyAccessKey; 
private String rnySecretKey; 
private S3Service rnyService; 
public ArnazonS3(String rnyAccessKey, String rnySecretKey) throws Exception 
public void CreateS3Bucket(S3Bucket bucket) throws Exception 
public void SendSecureFileObject(SecureFileObject sfo) 
public SecureFileObject GetSecureFileObject(String SecureFileName) 











public S30bject SendObject(S3Bucket myBucket,File tempFile) 
public S30bject SendObject(S3Bucket myBucket,String objectKey, String data) 
public S30bject GetObject(S3Bucket myBucket, String objectKey) 
public void ListObjects(S3Bucket myBucket) 
public void DeleteObject(S3Bucket bucket, String obj_Key) 
} 
A.4 Secure File Object Keywords 


















A.5 Secure File Object Keywords Processor 
public class SFOSecureKeywordsProcessor implements Serializable 
{ 
} 
public SFOSecureKeywords CreateSFOSecureKeywords(String Keywords,SecretKey kS) 
public boolean SearchForKeyword(byte[] capability, SFOSecureKeywords 
encryptedKeywords) 
A.6 Symmetric Searchable Encryption 
liThe class is used to generate aa SFOSecureKeywords instance 
public class SymmetricSearchableEncryption 
{ 
public SymmetricSearchableEncryption() 
public SecretKey GenerateHMACShaSecretKey() 
public SecretKey GenerateHMACShaSecretKey(byte[] ksBytes) 
liThe function generates a search capability for a given keyword which is then 
Ilused to query the encrypted files. 
public byte[] GenerateCapability(SecretKey ks, String keyword) 













public List<byte[]> GenerateEncryptedKeywordList(StringTokenizer keywords, 
Biglnteger r,Biglnteger flag, 
SecretKey kS) 
liThe function search the list of encrypted keywords looking for matches 
public boolean SearchEncryptedKeywordList(List<byte[]> KeywordList, 
byte[] searchCapability, Biglnteger flag, Biglnteger r) 
liThe function performs the cryptographic transformations to determine whether 
II a given capability matches an entry in the list 
public boolean SearchableKeyWordCompare(byte[] searchCapability, 
byte[] encryptedKeyWord,Biglnteger flag, Biglnteger r) 
public byte[] SearchableKeyWordEncrypt(String keyword,Biglnteger r, 
Biglnteger flag,SecretKey S) 
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